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INTRODUCTION
“You have some ideological extremist who has a big bankroll and they
can entirely skew our politics.” –Barack Obama, Press Conference
October 8, 2013 1

* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. I am grateful to Yasmin
Dawood, Chris Ellis, Chris Elmendorf, Ned Foley, David Fontana, Jim Gardner, Ruth
Greenwood, Rick Hasen, Deborah Hellman, Fran Hill, Aziz Huq, Ray La Raja, Jonathan
Masur, Jennifer Nou, Elizabeth Rigby, Doug Spencer, Geof Stone, David Strauss, Chris
Tausanovitch, Dan Weiner, Laura Weinrib, and Jeffrey Winters for their helpful comments.
My thanks also to the workshop participants at the University of Chicago, the Chicago Junior Faculty Workshop, the Brennan Center for Justice, and Valparaiso University, where I
presented earlier versions of the Article. I am pleased as well to acknowledge the support of
the Robert Helman Law and Public Policy Fund.
1
Press Release, The White House, Press Conference by the President (Oct. 8, 2013),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/10/08/press-conference-president).
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H

ERE are some facts about money and politics in today’s America.
At the federal level, campaign spending totaled $7.3 billion in
2012. 2 Almost all of this funding came from individual donors, not corporations or unions. 3 Individuals gave about half of their contributions to
specific candidates, a quarter to political parties, and a quarter to Political Action Committees (“PACs”) and Super PACs. 4 These donors were
in no way representative of the country as a whole. They were heavily
old, white, male, and, of course, wealthy. 5 They also were far more polarized in their political views than the general population. 6 Most Americans were moderates in 2012, but most donors were staunch liberals or
conservatives. 7
However, there is no evidence that much of this money is traded explicitly for political favors. Proof of quid pro quo transactions is vanish2

See Press Release, Fed. Election Comm’n, FEC Summarizes Campaign Activity of the
2011–2012 Election Cycle (Apr. 19, 2013), http://www.fec.gov/press/press2013/20130419_
2012-24m-Summary.shtml [hereinafter FEC 2012 Summary] (2012 spending by entities disclosing donors totaled $7.0 billion); 2012 Outside Spending, by Group, Ctr. for Responsive
Politics, http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2012&disp=O&type=
U&chrt=D (last visited June 23, 2015) (2012 spending by entities not disclosing donors totaled
$308.7 million).
3
See Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Why Is There So Little Money in U.S. Politics?, 17 J.
Econ. Persp. 105, 109 (2003) (“It is evident that individuals, rather than organizations, are by
far the most important source of campaign funds.”); Adam Bonica, Avenues of Influence:
On the Political Expenditures of Corporations and Their Directors and Executives 1, 8 (June
20, 2014) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2313232) (disclosing that corporate spending totaled only $75 million and disclosed union spending only $105
million in 2012).
4
See FEC 2012 Summary, supra note 2. Conventional PACs may contribute to candidates
but are subject to contribution limits in their fundraising. Super PACs may not contribute to
candidates but may raise money in unlimited quantities. See also SpeechNow.org v. FEC,
599 F.3d 686, 694–98 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (authorizing creation of Super PACs).
5
See Peter L. Francia et al., The Financiers of Congressional Elections: Investors, Ideologues, and Intimates 16 (2003) (“[C]ontributors are indeed overwhelmingly wealthy, highly
educated, male, and white. The pool of congressional contributors does not remotely look
like America . . . .”); Adam Bonica et al., Why Hasn’t Democracy Slowed Rising Inequality?, 27 J. Econ. Persp. 103, 111 (2013) (noting “that the share of campaign contributions
made by the top 0.01 percent of the voting age population is now over 40 percent”).
6
See Joseph Bafumi & Michael C. Herron, Leapfrog Representation and Extremism: A
Study of American Voters and Their Members in Congress, 104 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 519, 536
(2010) (showing bimodal distribution of donors compared to more normal distribution of
non-donors); Michael Barber, Representing the Preferences of Donors, Partisans, and Voters
in the U.S. Senate 19–20 (Apr. 30, 2014) (unpublished manuscript, available at https://csed.
byu.edu/Documents/BarberPaper2.pdf) (showing wide gulf between ideal points of donors
and voters).
7
See Bafumi & Herron, supra note 6, at 536; Barber, supra note 6, at 19–20.
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ingly rare, 8 and studies that try to document a link between PACs’ contributions and politicians’ votes typically come up empty. 9 But there is
evidence that politicians’ positions reflect the preferences of their donors
to an uncanny extent. 10 The ideal points of members of Congress—that
is, the “unique set[s] of policies that they ‘prefer’ to all others”—have
almost exactly the same bimodal distribution as the ideal points of individual contributors. 11 They look nothing like the far more centrist distribution of the public at large. 12
Suppose a jurisdiction is troubled by this situation and decides to enact some kind of campaign finance reform. What reason might it give?
One option is preventing the corruption of elected officials. But the Supreme Court has recently narrowed the definition of corruption to quid
pro quo exchanges, 13 and, as just noted, such exchanges do not occur
with any regularity in contemporary America. 14 Another possibility is
avoiding the distortion of electoral outcomes due to the heavy spending
of affluent individuals (and groups). But the Court has emphatically rejected any governmental interest in ameliorating “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth.” 15 Yet another idea is
equalizing the resources of candidates or the electoral influence of vot8
See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 149 (2003) (noting that, when assembling record
for Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Congress was unable to find “concrete evidence of an instance in which a federal officeholder has actually switched a vote” in response to a contribution).
9
See, e.g., Ansolabehere et al., supra note 3, at 116 (concluding in meta-study of relevant
literature that “changes in donations to an individual legislator do not translate into changes
in that legislator’s roll call voting behavior”). But see Thomas Stratmann, Some Talk: Money in Politics: A (Partial) Review of the Literature, 124 Pub. Choice 135, 146 (2005) (reaching opposite conclusion).
10
See Bafumi & Herron, supra note 6, at 536–37 (showing that members of Congress and
donors both have highly bimodal ideal point distributions); Barber, supra note 6, at 19–20
(showing that typical donor is much closer ideologically to her senator than is typical voter);
Bonica, supra note 3, at 17–18, 32 (also showing highly bimodal distributions for members
of Congress and donors).
11
Chris Tausanovitch & Christopher Warshaw, Measuring Constituent Policy Preferences
in Congress, State Legislatures, and Cities, 75 J. Pol. 330, 331 (2013); see also, e.g., Bafumi
& Herron, supra note 6, at 521 (“Ideal points . . . are best thought of as reflecting preferred
policy choices in a given policy space.”).
12
See supra note 10.
13
See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1450 (2014) (plurality opinion) (“Congress
may target only a specific type of corruption—‘quid pro quo’ corruption.”); Citizens United
v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 909–10 (2010).
14
See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text.
15
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 883 (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494
U.S. 652, 660 (1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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ers. But this equality interest has been deemed invalid in even more strident terms. “[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of
some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of
others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.” 16
So is our reformist jurisdiction out of luck? Not quite. This Article’s
thesis is that there is an additional interest, of the gravest importance,
that both is threatened by money in politics and is furthered by (certain)
campaign finance regulation. 17 This interest is the promotion of alignment between voters’ policy preferences and their government’s policy
outputs. Alignment operates at the levels of both the individual constituency and the jurisdiction as a whole. Within the constituency, the views
of the district’s median voter and the district’s representative should
align. One step up, the preferences of the jurisdiction’s median voter and
the legislature’s median member should correspond. Moreover, at the
jurisdictional level, the median voter’s views should be congruent not
only with the median legislator’s positions, but also with actual policy
outcomes. Preference alignment refers to the former sort of congruence;
outcome alignment to the latter.
Alignment is a significant—indeed, compelling—interest because of
its tight connection to core democratic values. At the district level, it follows closely from the delegate theory of representation. A delegate
“must do what his principal would do, must act as if the principal himself were acting . . . must vote as a majority of his constituents would,”
as Hanna Pitkin wrote in her landmark work. 18 In other words, a delegate must align his own positions with those of his constituents. Likewise, at the jurisdictional level, alignment is essentially another term for
majoritarianism. To say that policy should be congruent with the preferences of the median voter is to say that it should be congruent with the
preferences of the voting majority. Of course, majoritarianism is not our
only democratic principle. But, as Jeremy Waldron has argued, it is “re-

16

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976).
In earlier work, I have applied the alignment approach to election law as a whole. See
Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, 114 Colum. L. Rev. 283, 286–87
(2014); see also infra Section I.A (explaining motivation for campaign finance focus of this
Article).
18
Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation 144–45 (1967).
17
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quired as a matter of fairness to all those who participate in the social
choice.” 19
Unsurprisingly, given its democratic roots, the concept of alignment
has surfaced repeatedly in the Court’s campaign finance decisions. In a
2000 case, the Court recognized “the broader threat from politicians too
compliant with the wishes of large contributors”—and not compliant
enough with the wishes of voters. 20 In a 2003 case, the Court warned of
“the danger that officeholders will decide issues not on the merits or the
desires of their constituencies, but according to the wishes of those who
have made large financial contributions.” 21 And in its most recent campaign finance decision, McCutcheon v. FEC, 22 a decision otherwise unremittingly hostile to regulation, the Court strikingly concluded its opinion with a paean to alignment. “Representatives are not to follow
constituent orders, but can be expected to be cognizant of and responsive
to those concerns. Such responsiveness is key to the very concept of
self-governance through elected officials.” 23
Despite these doctrinal hints, some scholars claim that alignment is a
forbidden interest in the campaign finance context. Kathleen Sullivan
reasons that alignment reflects a particular theory of democracy, and that
speech cannot be restricted based on “one vision of good government.” 24
Similarly, Robert Post contends that in the First Amendment domain of
public discourse, public opinion is forever changing shape. Thus “[t]here
is . . . no ‘baseline’ from which [misalignment] can be assessed.” 25
These critiques are misplaced. As to Sullivan, it might be controversial
for the Court to embrace a specific model of democracy, but surely a
popularly elected legislature may do so. In fact, legislatures adopt theories of self-governance all the time, both when they regulate money in
politics and when they enact other electoral policies. As to Post, public
opinion actually is not as fluid as he suggests, and alignment furthers

19
Jeremy Waldron, Five to Four: Why Do Bare Majorities Rule on Courts?, 123 Yale L.J.
1692, 1718 (2014) (emphasis omitted) (referring to decision-making procedures in legislatures and courts).
20
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000).
21
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 153 (2003).
22
134 S. Ct. 1434, 1434 (2014) (plurality opinion).
23
Id. at 1462 (plurality opinion).
24
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. Davis L. Rev.
663, 680 (1997).
25
Robert C. Post, Citizens Divided: Campaign Finance Reform and the Constitution 53
(2014).
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what he deems the crucial aim of public discourse: making “persons believe that government is potentially responsive to their views.” 26 It is unclear as well why electoral speech should be considered part of public
discourse rather than the managerial domain of elections, in which
speech may be regulated to serve the domain’s ends.
Even if alignment is not a forbidden interest, it may be a duplicative
one. As Richard Hasen has argued, it may be nothing more than a slick
repackaging of the anti-distortion or equality interests that the Court already has rejected. 27 This charge also misses its mark. The distortion
that cannot justify campaign finance regulation, in the Court’s view, is
the skewing of electoral outcomes due to large expenditures. 28 The
Court has never suggested that the warping of policy outcomes due to
large contributions (or their equivalent) is an illegitimate basis for regulation. The distortion of voters is different from that of representatives.
Alignment also is distinct from equality (in all its guises). One form
of equality is the leveling of candidate resources. But candidates need
not be equally funded to produce alignment, nor does alignment follow
from evenly sized war chests. Another kind of equality is equal representation for all voters. But it is only the median voter, not every voter,
who is entitled to congruence under the alignment approach. Alignment
at the median can arise only if there is misalignment at all other points in
the distribution. A final type of equality is equal voter influence over the
political process. But equal influence is, at most, a means to achieving
alignment. It is not the end itself. Alignment also is possible under conditions of unequal influence, and equal influence does not necessarily
result in alignment.
Assume, then, that alignment is a compelling interest that neither is
barred by First Amendment theory nor is identical to goals the Court already has rebuffed. We are not done yet. The next step is to determine
whether money in politics can generate misalignment, and whether campaign finance reform can promote alignment. According to a burgeoning
political science literature, the answer to both questions is yes, at least
sometimes. The relevant empirical evidence fits into three categories.

26

Id. at 49.
See Richard L. Hasen, Is “Dependence Corruption” Distinct from a Political Equality
Argument for Campaign Finance Laws? A Reply to Professor Lessig, 12 Election L.J. 305,
308 (2013).
28
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
27
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First, according to numerous studies, wealthy Americans have more
influence on politicians’ voting records and actual policy outcomes than
do poor or middle-class Americans. 29 This extra sway is evident whether
House or Senate voting records, or state or federal policy outcomes, are
considered. It also appears even after non-monetary forms of political
participation (voting, volunteering, contacting officials, etc.) are controlled for. Second, as noted at the outset, politicians and donors have
nearly identical ideal point distributions: highly bimodal curves in which
they cluster at the ideological extremes and almost no one occupies the
moderate center. 30 Voters’ views, in contrast, exhibit a normal distribution whose single peak is in the middle of the political spectrum. It is
fair to say that donors receive exquisitely attentive representation—and
that voters receive virtually no representation at all.
Third, campaign finance regulation can be aligning or misaligning
based on its implications for how candidates raise their money. 31 Tight
individual contribution limits reduce the funds available from polarized
individual donors. They therefore encourage candidates to shift toward
the ideological center, the home of the median voter. Conversely, stringent party or PAC contribution limits have the opposite effect. Both parties and PACs are relatively moderate in their giving patterns—parties
because their chief goal is winning as many seats as possible, PACs because they want access to incumbents of all political stripes. Reducing
the funds available from these more centrist sources thus incentivizes
candidates to move toward the ideological fringes. As for public financing, its impact hinges on its treatment of individual donors. “Clean money” schemes that provide block grants to candidates after they receive
enough individual contributions are misaligning because of the extremism of the donors who initially must be wooed. But multiple-match systems that offer high matching ratios for small contributions may be
aligning because of the more representative pool of donors they attract.
What do these findings mean for the constitutionality of different policies? Individual contribution limits would sit on sturdy legal ground
under the alignment approach. Whatever their link may be to the prevention of corruption, they demonstrably further the governmental interest
in alignment. Unlike under current law, individual expenditure limits al-

29

See infra Section III.A.
See infra Section III.B.
31
See infra Section III.C.
30
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so might survive judicial scrutiny. Since politicians mirror the views of
not only individuals who donate directly to them, but also individuals
who spend on their behalf, no great significance would attach to the contribution/expenditure distinction. Public financing that relies on individual donors who resemble the general population (or that does not rely on
individual donors at all) would be valid as well. On the other hand, contribution and expenditure limits for parties and PACs could not be sustained by reference to alignment. Since these entities are relatively moderate, their funds exert little misaligning pressure. Public financing that
requires appeals to polarized individual donors also could be justified
only on the basis of other interests.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I introduces the alignment interest. It describes the different forms of alignment, explains the role the
concept has played in earlier campaign finance cases, and responds to
the claim that general First Amendment principles proscribe the interest.
Part II argues for the distinctiveness of alignment. It compares alignment
to the interests the Court already has considered—anti-corruption, antidistortion, and equality—and shows that it is different from each of
them. Part III conveys the current state of knowledge about alignment. It
summarizes the many studies on the misaligning influence of money in
politics, as well as the fewer studies on the aligning impact of (some)
regulation. Lastly, Part IV assesses the implications of this literature for
the validity of different policies. Individual contribution and expenditure
limits, and certain kinds of public financing, should be upheld because
they promote alignment. But contribution and expenditure limits for parties and PACs, and other kinds of public financing, cannot be justified
on this basis.
One final question should be answered before proceeding further.
Given the array of interests already asserted in the campaign finance
context, is there really a need for another one? In fact, the need is dire,
for two reasons. First, the only interest the Court currently considers to
be legitimate—the narrowly construed anti-corruption interest—neither
captures the full extent of the harm caused by money in politics, nor is
sufficient to sustain most campaign finance regulation. In recent years,
policies have toppled like dominos, rejected by the Court due to a lack
of fit with this interest. If the reform project is to avoid collapsing entire-
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ly, we must, in Michael Kang’s words, “look[] beyond the prevention of
corruption as defined by the Court.” 32
Second, the misalignment produced by electoral fundraising and
spending is not holding steady. Instead, it is getting worse. Over the last
generation, the share of campaign funds provided by the wealthiest
0.01% of Americans has surged from about 10% to more than 40%. 33
During the same period, individual donors steadily have become more
extreme in their political views, 34 and candidates steadily have become
more dependent on their contributions. 35 As a result, the representational
gap in favor of the affluent is now five times larger than it was in the
1970s and 1980s. 36 Misalignment thus is not a problem that can safely
be ignored. Rather, it is a problem that—increasingly—threatens to
swallow American democracy.
I. THE ALIGNMENT INTEREST
The term alignment is unhelpful until it is clear what should be
aligned and where. I begin this Part, then, by identifying two axes that
can be used to categorize different forms of alignment. The first refers to
the governmental output that should be aligned with voters’ preferences;
32

Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 Va. L. Rev. 1, 47 (2012); see
also Richard Briffault, On Dejudicializing American Campaign Finance Law, 27 Ga. St. U.
L. Rev. 887, 890 (2011) (“The central constitutional question in campaign finance law is
what public interests justify restrictions . . . affecting the use of campaign money.”); GuyUriel E. Charles, Corruption Temptation, 102 Calif. L. Rev. 25, 26 (2014) (“We no longer
talk about the gamut of values that we would like to see reflected in a system of campaign
financing.”).
33
See Bonica et al., supra note 5, at 112.
34
See Raymond J. La Raja & David L. Wiltse, Don’t Blame Donors for Ideological Polarization of Political Parties: Ideological Change and Stability Among Political Contributors,
1972–2008, 40 Am. Pol. Res. 501, 510 (2011) (showing rise in proportion of donors who are
“ideologues” from 40% in 1972 to 60% in 2008).
35
See Michael Barber, Ideological Donors, Contribution Limits, and the Polarization of State
Legislatures 22 (Oct. 3, 2013) (unpublished manuscript, available at https://politicalscience.
byu.edu/Faculty/Thursday%20Group%20Papers/Limits.pdf) (showing rise in share of state legislative candidate funds received from individual donors from 25% in 1990 to 50% in 2012);
Michael Barber & Nolan McCarty, Causes and Consequences of Polarization, in Negotiating
Agreement in Politics: Report of the Task Force on Negotiating Agreement in Politics 31
(Jane Mansbridge & Cathie Jo Martin eds., 2013) (showing analogous rise in individual contributions to congressional candidates from 50% to 75%).
36
See Christopher Ellis, Representational Inequity Across Time and Space: Exploring
Changes in the Political Representation of the Poor in the U.S. House 9 (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) (showing gap between alignment
of House members with rich and with poor constituents over time).

COPYRIGHT © 2015, VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

1434

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 101:1425

the second to the governmental level where the alignment should occur.
After defining the alignment interest, I address a series of related issues:
its democratic appeal, its administrability, its novelty, and its legal and
practical limitations.
Upon conclusion of this brisk survey, I turn to the place of alignment
in the campaign finance doctrine. The Supreme Court often has used
language evoking alignment to denote a legitimate basis for regulation,
including in its most recent decision on the subject. But, ironically, the
substance of the Court’s holdings often has contributed to the misalignment that plagues modern American politics. And again the Court’s
most recent case is no exception.
Lastly, I respond to the critique, made in the 1990s by Sullivan and in
the 2013 Tanner Lectures by Post, that alignment (or something like it)
is a forbidden interest in the campaign finance context. Sullivan wrongly
claims that it is impermissible for a jurisdiction to embrace a particular
theory of democracy, and wrongly supposes that such a choice can be
avoided. And Post should be more receptive to actual alignment given
his endorsement of perceived alignment as a basis for regulation. The
gap between reality and perception is insufficient to bar one interest but
to compel the other.
A. Reprise
I mentioned above that my survey of the alignment interest would be
brisk. This is because I have elaborated on the interest elsewhere, in
work arguing for the adoption of alignment as an overarching principle
of election law. 37 There is no reason to repeat all of that analysis here.
But there is reason to say more about alignment in the campaign finance
context specifically. As noted earlier, the anti-corruption interest urgently needs to be bolstered, and the misalignment caused by money in politics is steadily worsening. 38 The bulk of the Article thus examines the
intersection of alignment and campaign finance. Only this Section deals
with alignment more generally.

37

See generally Stephanopoulos, supra note 17 (introducing and urging adoption of alignment approach).
38
See supra notes 32–36 and accompanying text. This also is the only domain where the
very validity of the alignment interest is disputed.

COPYRIGHT © 2015, VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2015]

Aligning Campaign Finance Law

1435

Starting with taxonomy, there are three kinds of governmental outputs
that should be congruent with voters’ preferences. 39 The first is a representative’s partisan affiliation. If a representative belongs to the party
preferred by the median voter, 40 then there is partisan alignment. The
second is a representative’s policy views. If a representative has the
same ideal point as the median voter, then there is preference alignment.
And the third is actual policy outcomes. If enacted policy corresponds to
the wishes of the median voter, then there is outcome alignment. Of
these three variants, I address only the latter two in this Article (and depict only them in Figure 1). Asymmetric campaign spending can cause
partisan misalignment, by shifting electoral outcomes from what they
would have been under conditions of more equal outlays. 41 But this is
the one form of misalignment that the Court’s precedent unambiguously
rules out as an acceptable basis for regulation. 42
Next, there are two governmental levels at which alignment should
occur. 43 The first is the individual constituency, in which the preferences
of the district’s median voter and the district’s representative should be
congruent. Since districts have (almost) no policymaking authority, only
39

See Stephanopoulos, supra note 17, at 304–10. Careful readers may note that my terminology is slightly different here than in my earlier work. What I previously called “policy
alignment” I now refer to as “preference alignment.” I also discuss outcome alignment in
this Article while I omitted it before. See id. at 311–12.
40
The median voter is the voter at the midpoint of the relevant distribution. Only this voter
necessarily represents the views of a majority of the electorate, and so cannot be outvoted by
any other group. For this majoritarian reason, the median voter serves here as the normative
benchmark relative to which alignment is determined.
41
See Stephanopoulos, supra note 17, at 338–39. In this case, misalignment ensues between the median actual voter and the median hypothetical voter exposed to more equal outlays. See id.
42
In case after case, the Court has rejected interests that are based on a benchmark of
equal campaign spending. See, e.g., Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett,
131 S. Ct. 2806, 2825 (2011) (“We have repeatedly rejected the argument that the government has a compelling state interest in ‘leveling the playing field’ that can justify undue burdens on political speech.”); Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 904 (2010) (rejecting
interest in preventing distortion of electoral outcomes due to heavy corporate spending); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 741–42 (2008) (rejecting interest in “level[ing] electoral opportunities for candidates of different personal wealth”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 54 (1976)
(rejecting “interest in equalizing the relative financial resources of candidates competing for
elective office”). I do not agree with these cases’ reasoning, but I bracket this disagreement
for present purposes.
43
See Stephanopoulos, supra note 17, at 310–11. Again, my terminology for these levels is
slightly different here than in previous work. What I previously called “district-specific
alignment” I now refer to as “dyadic alignment,” and what I previously labeled “legislative
alignment” I now dub “collective alignment.”
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partisan alignment and preference alignment are sensible concepts at this
level. The second is the jurisdiction as a whole, in which governmental
outputs should match the preferences of the jurisdiction’s median voter.
With respect to partisan alignment and preference alignment, the relevant outputs are, in turn, the partisan affiliation and the ideal point of the
median legislator. With respect to outcome alignment, the relevant output is enacted policy. As discussed below, both dyadic and collective
alignment should be deemed valid rationales for regulation. 44
Figure 1: Illustrations of Preference and Outcome Misalignment

Why, then, is alignment an attractive value? The most important answer is that it is implied by several widely accepted theories of democracy. At the dyadic level, one of the classic conceptions of the representative’s role is the delegate model. As the earlier quote from Hanna
Pitkin illustrates, a delegate is supposed to act in accordance with the
wishes of his constituents—to “do what his principal would do.” 45 In the
words of two other theorists, “The delegate theory of representation . . . posits that the representative ought to reflect purposively the
preferences of his constituents.” 46 Both of these formulations come close
to requiring alignment. If a delegate does what his constituents want, he
should be aligning his positions with theirs.
Likewise, at the collective level, one (though hardly the only) pillar of
American democratic thought is majoritarianism. Madison stated in The
Federalist Papers that the “fundamental principle of free government” is

44

See infra Sections I.B–I.C, Part II.
Pitkin, supra note 18, at 144.
46
Donald J. McCrone & James H. Kuklinski, The Delegate Theory of Representation, 23
Am. J. Pol. Sci. 278, 278 (1979).
45
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that the “majority . . . would rule.” 47 Hamilton declared it a “poison” to
“subject the sense of the greater number to that of the lesser.” 48 In more
recent times too, Alexander Bickel has remarked that we are “a nation
committed to . . . majoritarian democracy,” 49 and Jesse Choper has written that throughout “this nation’s constitutional development from its
origin to the present time, majority rule has been considered the keystone of a democratic political system.” 50 Once again, alignment follows
from these arguments. If the wishes of the collective majority (embodied
in the median voter) are heeded by officeholders, then governmental
outputs should be congruent with those wishes. 51
To be sure, there are other theories of democracy with which alignment is in tension. 52 The trustee model of representation holds that elected officials should exercise their own independent judgment, not abide
by the preferences of their constituents. 53 Pluralists argue that “minorities rule” as they join together in ever shifting combinations. 54 Minimalist democrats downplay congruence in favor of retrospective accountability based on politicians’ records in office. 55 And so forth. But the
point here is not that alignment is required by democratic theory. It is
only that alignment is consistent with key conceptions of democracy—
and thus that jurisdictions should have the discretion to invoke it if they

47

The Federalist No. 58 (James Madison).
The Federalist No. 22 (Alexander Hamilton). My aim here is not to make an originalist
case for alignment, but rather to observe that positions consistent with it are well within the
mainstream of the American democratic tradition. See also Bruce E. Cain, Democracy More
or Less: America’s Political Reform Quandary 147 (2015) (observing that populism is one
of three major schools of American democratic thought, and that populism understands
“democratic distortion” to be “a chronic deviation from median voter preference”).
49
Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of
Politics 188 (1962).
50
Jesse H. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process: A Functional Reconsideration of the Role of the Supreme Court 4 (1980).
51
Of course, majoritarianism is inapplicable to “areas that the Constitution has declared
off-limits to ordinary politics,” such as the provisions of the Bill of Rights. Stephanopoulos,
supra note 17, at 321. It also is important to distinguish between majoritarianism in the election of representatives and majoritarianism in the adoption of positions and policies by representatives. Only the latter form of majoritarianism is equivalent to alignment.
52
Though as I have explained in my previous work, this tension is more illusory than real,
in particular for pluralism and minimalism. See id. at 313–16.
53
See Pitkin, supra note 18, at 127.
54
Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory 132 (1956).
55
See Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy 272 (2d ed. 1947).
48
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so desire. Alignment may not be an obligatory state interest, but surely
its democratic origin makes it a permissible one. 56
The other advantage of alignment is that it is more determinate than
concepts such as corruption, distortion, and equality. As I explain in Part
II, the Court has struggled for nearly forty years to construe these terms,
lurching unpredictably from one definition to another. 57 In contrast,
alignment quite plainly refers to the correspondence of a given popular
input with a given governmental output. Per the above taxonomy, it is
true that there are different inputs and outputs that can be aligned at different levels. But this only means that there are several kinds of alignment. It does not undermine the clarity of the idea itself. If “[a]n ounce
of administrability is worth a pound of theoretical perfection,” as David
Strauss has quipped about justifications for campaign finance reform,
then alignment may tip the scale. 58
A skeptic might retort that alignment is theoretically determinate but
practically hopeless. How, after all, are voters’ policy preferences and
their government’s policy outputs even supposed to be measured, let
alone compared to each other? Not long ago, this objection might have
been fatal. But in the last few years, political scientists have made great
strides in quantifying both public opinion and the activities of elected officials. 59 The most promising “new work takes advantage of questions
answered by both voters and representatives to plot their positions in a
common policy space.” 60 To the extent that they pertain to money in
politics, these studies are discussed in Part III. 61 In sum, this scholarship
leaves little doubt that, as a group of political scientists has written,
“methodological advances [now] allow us to evaluate the congruence
between voters and legislators across districts and time.” 62
56

A fascinating issue, which I note here but do not explore further, is what makes a given
interest “compelling” for purposes of constitutional law. Is it enough that an interest corresponds to a theory of democracy? But, if so, why is equality not a compelling interest? And
how does an interest rooted in a democratic theory rate relative to interests based on other
values, such as national security or the righting of historical wrongs? These are important
and difficult questions, and I hope to address them in future work.
57
See infra Part II.
58
David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 Colum. L.
Rev. 1369, 1386 (1994).
59
See Stephanopoulos, supra note 17, at 308 n.102 (discussing these advances).
60
See id. at 308–09 & n.103 (examining these studies in particular).
61
See infra Part III.
62
Thad Kousser et al., Reform and Representation: A New Method Applied to Recent
Electoral Changes 2 (June 3, 2014) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://
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But while the indeterminacy charge falls flat, there are other critiques
(or, rather, caveats) that ought to be acknowledged. First, the alignment
interest does not always support the lawfulness of campaign finance
regulation. Policies that exert an aligning influence may be defended on
this basis. But policies whose effects are ambiguous or misaligning—of
which there are many—must be tethered to other interests or else face
invalidation. Alignment does not give a free pass to challenged laws.
Second, while no other scholar has argued explicitly for alignment as a
compelling interest, the idea that money in politics may disrupt the link
between public opinion and public policy is not new. It has appeared in
the work of, among others, Richard Briffault, Bruce Cain, Samuel Issacharoff, and Lawrence Lessig. 63 What is new here is the framing of the
issue as well as the systematic treatment of the theory, doctrine, and empirics of alignment.
Third, alignment is not, of course, the only available interest in the
campaign finance context. The prevention of (a constricted notion of)
corruption remains a valid basis for regulation, and the Court also recognizes an informational interest in providing voters with data about
campaign contributions and expenditures. 64 Moreover, the anti-distortion
and equality rationales may have been “orphaned,” in Hasen’s phrase,
but their resonance cannot be denied in a democracy that adheres to the
principle of one person, one vote. 65 Fourth, it is important to be clear
ssrn.com/abstract=2260083); see also, e.g., Bafumi & Herron, supra note 6, at 524 (noting
ability to “bridg[e] institutions and voters in a way that allows common space ideal point estimates to be generated”); Boris Shor, All Together Now: Putting Congress, State Legislatures, and Individuals in a Common Ideological Space to Assess Representation at the Macro
and Micro Levels 3 (Apr. 25, 2011) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law
Review Association) (succeeding in “measuring ideological distributions of state congressional delegations, legislatures, and citizens all on the same scale”). Moreover, both voters’
and officeholders’ ideologies typically can be captured by a single left-right dimension corresponding to governmental intervention in the economy (at least in recent years). See
Stephanopoulos, supra note 17, at 309 & nn.104–05.
63
See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Republic, Lost: How Money Corrupts Congress—and a Plan
to Stop It 151 (2011) (proposing concept of “substantive distortion,” the “gap between what
‘the People’ believe about an issue and what Congress does about that issue”); Richard
Briffault, Issue Advocacy: Redrawing the Elections/Politics Line, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 1751,
1772 (1999) (identifying “danger that officeholders will be too attentive to the interests of
donors . . . and insufficiently concerned about the public interest”); Bruce E. Cain, Moralism
and Realism in Campaign Finance Reform, 1995 U. Chi. Legal F. 111, 138; Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 118, 126 (2010).
64
See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914 (2010).
65
See Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Orphaned Antidistortion Rationale, 27
Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 989, 990 (2011). There also are several important election law values oth-
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that money in politics is only one of many causes of misalignment in today’s America. Even if the misaligning effects of campaign funds were
eliminated entirely, significant non-congruence would persist thanks to
franchise restrictions, partisan pressures, legislative rules, gerrymandered districts, etc. Misalignment is a complex phenomenon with no
simple solution. 66
And fifth, perfect alignment is an inherently unattainable goal. Even a
jurisdiction (or representative) that cares about nothing else might lack
information about voters’ preferences on certain subjects, or be unable
to change policies (or policy stances) at exactly the same rate at which
public opinion shifts. Voters’ preferences on particular matters also
might be weak, uninformed, or unstable—and so less worthy of respect
from a democratic perspective (and more difficult to heed from a practical one). Overall ideological alignment, then, is more vital than alignment on each individual issue that appears on the political agenda.
Likewise, persistent misalignment is more objectionable than misalignment that is temporary and soon resolves. 67
Lastly, it is worth noting two ways in which the alignment approach
advocated here is more modest than the one I have recommended elsewhere. First, I only claim that alignment is a legitimate interest that may
shield aligning laws from invalidation. I do not claim that alignment is a
constitutional imperative that may be wielded as a sword to strike down
misaligning laws. 68 And second, the only benchmark I use for assessing
alignment is the median actual voter. I do not consider more exotic
benchmarks such as the median hypothetical voter exposed to more even
campaign spending. 69 The normative appeal of the median actual voter
is hard to deny in a democracy in which the electorate chooses the representatives who then enact policy. There also is little relevant difference
between the median actual voter and other attractive figures such as the
median eligible voter or the median citizen. All of these figures’ policy
er than alignment, such as competition, participation, and minority representation. See
Stephanopoulos, supra note 17, at 356–58, 360.
66
See Stephanopoulos, supra note 17, at 324–36, 342–55, 360–65 (discussing misaligning
effects of other election laws); id. at 360–65 (discussing misaligning effects of non-legal factors).
67
See id. at 309–10 (also making this point).
68
See id. at 327, 333–34, 346, 353 (discussing situations where alignment could be used as
sword).
69
See id. at 338; see also id. at 325 (using benchmark of median eligible voter who would
have gone to polls in absence of franchise restriction).
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preferences are quite centrist—in marked contrast to the views of those
who represent them. 70
B. Doctrinal Role
The above was admittedly a bit of a breakneck tour of the alignment
interest. But it sufficed, I hope, to lay the groundwork for the ensuing
application of the interest to campaign finance law. 71 I begin this application by considering the role that alignment has played in the Court’s
cases on money in politics. It by no means has been their centerpiece,
but it has appeared in them repeatedly—less surprisingly in the more
pro-regulatory period of the early 2000s, but more unexpectedly in the
Court’s most recent blockbuster, McCutcheon v. FEC. 72 However, despite the lip service they sometimes have paid to alignment, the Court’s
decisions also have helped produce the startling misalignment that defines American politics today. By nullifying all expenditure limits and,
just this year, permitting much larger aggregate contributions, the Court
often has strengthened misaligning forces at the expense of aligning
ones.
Most analyses of campaign finance doctrine begin with the 1976 decision of Buckley v. Valeo, 73 but the Court’s first references to alignment
date back (at least) to 1957. In United States v. Automobile Workers, 74
involving the prosecution of a labor union for funding a campaign commercial, the Court defended the federal ban on corporate and union electoral activity as follows: “The idea is to prevent . . . the great aggregations of wealth from using their corporate funds . . . to send members of
the legislature to these halls in order to vote for their protection and the
advancement of their interests as against those of the public.” 75 The

70
If anything, actual voters are more extreme (and, on net, conservative) than eligible nonvoters or non-eligible non-voters. See, e.g., Jan E. Leighley & Jonathan Nagler, Who Votes
Now? Demographics, Issues, Inequality, and Turnout in the United States 159 (2013); John
D. Griffin & Brian Newman, Are Voters Better Represented?, 67 J. Pol. 1206, 1214 (2005).
The levels of misalignment reported in Part III thus would increase if a different benchmark
were used.
71
Readers who would like a more extensive treatment should consult my earlier work. See
Stephanopoulos, supra note 17, at 304–65 (detailing alignment approach to election law).
72
134 S. Ct. at 1461–62.
73
See, e.g., id. at 1444 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)).
74
352 U.S. 567 (1957).
75
Id. at 571 (quoting Elihu Root, Addresses on Government and Citizenship 143 (Robert
Bacon & James Brown Scott eds., 1916)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Court added that “when an individual or association of individuals
makes large contributions . . . they . . . occasionally, at least, receive,
consideration by the beneficiaries of their contributions which not infrequently is harmful to the general public interest.” 76
Both of these passages articulate an interest akin to alignment. In the
first excerpt, the stated purpose of the federal ban is preventing elected
officials from pursuing the “protection and the advancement of [corporate] interests” and so neglecting “those of the public.” 77 This is another
way of saying that the ban aims to avoid misalignment in the direction
of corporate concerns. Similarly, the second quote asserts that large contributions sometimes can induce “consideration by the beneficiaries”
that is “harmful to the general public interest.” 78 In other words, large
contributions sometimes can induce misalignment in the direction of
contributors.
In the post-Buckley era, the first hint of the alignment interest came in
the 1985 case of FEC v. NCPAC. 79 The majority struck down a limit on
PAC spending in presidential races. 80 But in dissent, Justice White
voiced his concern about the potential “infusion of massive PAC expenditures into the political process.” 81 His fear was that, thanks to these
expenditures, “[t]he candidate may be forced to please the spenders rather than the voters, and the two groups are not identical.” 82 That is, the
candidate may be forced to align her positions with the spenders who
support her campaign rather than the voters who actually elect her.
Justice White’s argument in dissent became the holding of the Court
in two important cases in the early 2000s. First, in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, the Court described the problem that contribution limits are meant to solve as the “broader threat from politicians too

76
Id. at 576 (quoting 65 Cong. Rec. 9507 (1924) (statement of Sen. Robinson)); see also id.
(“[O]ne of the great political evils of the time is the apparent hold on political parties which
business interests . . . seek and sometimes obtain by reason of liberal campaign contributions.” (quoting 65 Cong. Rec. 9507 (1924) (statement of Sen. Robinson))).
77
Id. at 571 (quoting Root, supra note 75) (internal quotation marks omitted).
78
Id. at 576 (quoting 65 Cong. Rec. 9507 (1924) (statement of Sen. Robinson)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). To be fair, the “public interest” is not necessarily identical to the
views held by the median voter. These excerpts thus convey a slightly different conception
of misalignment.
79
470 U.S. 480 (1985).
80
See id. at 501.
81
Id. at 517.
82
Id.
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compliant with the wishes of large contributors.” 83 Politicians too compliant with the wishes of contributors, of course, are not compliant
enough with those of voters. The Court also noted that outsized checks
can foster the “cynical assumption that large donors call the tune.” 84
This is a claim about the appearance rather than the reality of misalignment, but it sounds in a similar register.
Second, in McConnell v. FEC, 85 the Court used language even more
evocative of alignment to uphold the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act’s
(“BCRA”) soft money ban. 86 The Court observed that soft money donors received special access to officeholders, which led in turn to undue
influence over their decisions. “Implicit . . . in the sale of access is the
suggestion that money buys influence.” 87 The Court also catalogued a
number of cases in which soft money donors managed to thwart the passage of popular bills. “The evidence connects soft money to manipulations of the legislative calendar, leading to Congress’ failure to enact,
among other things, generic drug legislation, tort reform, and tobacco
legislation.” 88 And in its clearest ever statement of the alignment interest, the Court declared, “Just as troubling to a functioning democracy . . . is the danger that officeholders will decide issues not on . . . the
desires of their constituencies, but according to the wishes of those who
have made large financial contributions valued by the officeholder.” 89
This “danger” is the essence of misalignment.
In the decade after McConnell, no Court majority referred to alignment, but the concept continued to surface in individual Justices’ opinions. In the 2007 case of FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., Justice
Scalia lamented that “the effect of BCRA has been to concentrate more

83

528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000).
Id. at 390; see also id. at 401 (Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing that contribution limits
“seek to protect the integrity of the electoral process—the means through which a free society democratically translates political speech into concrete governmental action”); FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 441 (2001) (citing language from
Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 388–89 on “undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment”).
85
540 U.S. 93 (2003).
86
“Soft money” refers to previously unregulated funds that were donated to political parties to pay for activities other than express advocacy for or against candidates. See id. at
122–24.
87
Id. at 154 (“[P]urchasers of such access unabashedly admit that they are seeking to purchase just such influence.”).
88
Id. at 150.
89
Id. at 153.
84
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political power in the hands of the country’s wealthiest individuals.” 90
He noted that in 2004, “a mere 24 individuals contributed an astounding
total of $142 million to [unregulated groups].” 91 In the 2010 case of Citizens United v. FEC, Justice Stevens argued that when “private interests . . . exert outsized control over officeholders solely on account of
the money spent on (or withheld from) their campaigns, the result
can . . . [be] a ‘subversion . . . of the electoral process.’” 92 And in the
2011 case of Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v.
Bennett, Justice Kagan remarked that the “ultimate object” of the First
Amendment is “a government responsive to the will of the people.” 93
She added that “[i]f an officeholder owes his election to wealthy contributors, he may act for their benefit alone, rather than on behalf of all
the people.” 94
Lest these comments be dismissed as the sour grapes of dissenting
Justices, the full Court, in its most recent campaign finance case,
McCutcheon v. FEC, 95 concluded its opinion with what can be read as a
tribute to alignment. “For the past 40 years, our campaign finance jurisprudence has focused on the need to . . . [avoid] compromising the political responsiveness at the heart of the democratic process,” began the
Court’s coda. 96 Turning to political theory, the Court continued: “As
Edmund Burke explained . . . a representative owes constituents . . . judgment informed by ‘the strictest union, the closest correspondence, and the most unreserved communication with his constituents.’” 97 And summing up its views, the Court announced,
“Representatives are not to follow constituent orders, but can be expected to be cognizant of and responsive to those concerns. Such re-

90

551 U.S. 449, 503 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 503–04; see also id. at 522 (Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing the “pervasive distortion of electoral institutions by concentrated wealth” through “the special access and
guaranteed favor that sap the representative integrity of American government”).
92
130 S. Ct. 876, 962–63 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting Auto. Workers, 352 U.S. at 575).
93
131 S. Ct. 2806, 2846 (2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
94
Id. at 2830.
95
134 S. Ct. at 1434.
96
Id. at 1461 (plurality opinion).
97
Id. at 1461–62 (quoting Edmund Burke, The Speeches of the Right Hon. Edmund Burke
129–30 (J. Burke ed., Dublin, James Duffy 1867)).
91
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sponsiveness is key to the very concept of self-governance through
elected officials.” 98
Given the context, it is unclear what kind of responsiveness the Court
had in mind when it penned this passage. In McCutcheon, the Court
voided aggregate contribution limits that imposed a ceiling on the total
amount of money that donors could give in federal elections. 99 The
Court thus may have been lauding politicians’ responsiveness to contributors here, not their responsiveness to voters. 100 But even if this is
what the Court meant, it certainly is not what it said. Indeed, the Court
referred three times to “constituents” as the group to which elected officials should be responsive. 101 Accordingly, McCutcheon remains the
Court’s most recent, most extensive—and most unexpected—account of
the importance of alignment.
To be sure, neither McCutcheon nor any other case actually has held
that alignment is a distinct governmental interest that can justify the regulation of campaign funds. The paean in McCutcheon was pure dictum
in a decision otherwise hostile to regulation. 102 Likewise, the excerpts
from Shrink Missouri and McConnell were efforts to broaden the
Court’s definition of corruption, not to devise a new rationale for regulation. 103 The Court also has shied away from these excerpts in subsequent
cases. 104 The point, then, is not that the Court has been employing something like the alignment approach all along. It plainly has not been. Ra-

98

Id. at 1462; see also id. at 1441 (arguing that “a central feature of democracy” is that
“constituents support candidates who share their beliefs and interests, and candidates who
are elected can be expected to be responsive to those concerns”). Justice Breyer’s dissent
also contained several passages noting the importance of alignment. See, e.g., id. at 1467
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing “the end that government may be responsive to the will of
the people” (quoting Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931))); id. at 1468 (explaining “the constitutional effort to create a democracy responsive to the people—a government where laws reflect the very thoughts, views, ideas, and sentiments”).
99
See id. at 1442–43 (plurality opinion) (describing operation of aggregate limits).
100
Some support for this view comes from Justice Kennedy’s opinion in McConnell. He
also declared that “[d]emocracy is premised on responsiveness,” and elaborated that “a substantial and legitimate reason . . . to make a contribution to[] one candidate over another is
that the candidate will respond by producing those political outcomes the supporter favors.”
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 297 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
101
See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1461–62.
102
See, e.g., id. at 1441 (listing types of campaign finance laws barred by Court’s precedent).
103
See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 153; Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 389.
104
See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441; Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910.
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ther, the point is that the Court sometimes has appreciated the value of
alignment, and sometimes has recognized that money in politics can exert a misaligning influence. Were a future Court to designate alignment
as a discrete state interest, it thus would be building on—not disrupting—its own precedent. (And this is very much a project for a future
Court; the odds of the current majority embracing a new state interest in
this area are next to nil.)
A second caveat about the Court’s case law is that however positively
it might have portrayed alignment, its actual impact often has been highly misaligning. As discussed in Part III, the key mechanism through
which money in politics causes misalignment is the donating and spending of highly unrepresentative individuals. 105 Either candidates shift their
positions in these individuals’ direction in order to attract more funding,
or only candidates who share the individuals’ positions in the first place
become financially viable. Either way, non-congruence ensues in favor
of this class of donors and spenders—and against ordinary voters.
The Court’s decisions have bolstered this dynamic by removing many
of the constraints that jurisdictions have tried to place on individual contributions and expenditures. In Buckley itself, the Court struck down limits imposed by Congress on individual expenditures. 106 In Citizens United, the Court vetoed limits on corporate expenditures as well. 107 Its
conclusion that independent expenditures are inherently noncorrupting 108 also enabled the creation of Super PACs: entities that can
accept unlimited contributions (mostly from wealthy individuals) because they devote all of their resources to expenditures rather than candidate donations. 109 And in McCutcheon, the Court dismantled the aggregate contribution limits that had prevented rich donors from writing
checks to dozens or hundreds of a party’s candidates. 110 Now a single
donor may give as much as $3.6 million in a single cycle. 111
In combination, these decisions have increased sharply the resources
that affluent individuals can bring to bear on the electoral process. Had
105

See infra Part III.
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39–51.
107
See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 896–913.
108
See id. at 910 (“[I]ndependent expenditures do not lead to, or create the appearance of,
quid pro quo corruption.”).
109
See supra note 4; see also Kang, supra note 32, at 34 (discussing formation of Super
PACs in immediate aftermath of Citizens United).
110
See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1444–62 (plurality opinion).
111
See id. at 1473–74 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
106
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all three cases come out the other way, for instance, individuals would
be able to donate no more than $5,200 per federal candidate, 112 no more
than $123,200 in aggregate, 113 and not at all to Super PACs (which
would not exist). 114 Individuals also would be able to spend no more
than $2,000 advocating for the election or defeat of a given candidate. 115
In contrast, under current law, a single billionaire, Sheldon Adelson,
managed to deploy $150 million in the 2012 cycle, mostly in contributions to Super PACs and other even less regulated groups. 116 Another
150 or so individuals provided at least $1 million each. 117 It is the Court,
then, that deserves a good deal of the blame for the misalignment that
pervades American politics. The Court’s rulings have freed wealthy individuals from most of their regulatory restraints, thus intensifying their
misaligning effect on the political system. Regrettably, this actual effect
far outweighs the Court’s occasional warm words about the merits of
alignment.
C. A Forbidden Interest?
And as for these warm words, two prominent scholars warn that they
should not be taken too seriously. In fact, according to both Sullivan and
Post, alignment (or something closely related to it) is a forbidden interest
in the campaign finance context, barred by general First Amendment
principles. Sullivan’s critique is based on her observation that a jurisdiction that asserts the alignment interest thereby commits itself to a particular conception of democracy. Post’s challenge follows from his view
that public opinion is inherently fluid, and thus incapable of being
aligned or misaligned with any governmental output. I respond to both
of their claims below.
Beginning with Sullivan, she acknowledges that concern about misalignment is a common rationale for campaign finance regulation. “Of112
See id. at 1442 (plurality opinion) (noting current base contribution limit). All figures
cited here are per two-year election cycle.
113
See id. at 1443 (noting aggregate contribution limit struck down in case).
114
See supra note 112 and accompanying text (discussing role of Citizens United in giving
rise to Super PACs).
115
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39–40 (per curiam) (noting individual expenditure limit struck
down in case).
116
See Peter H. Stone, Sheldon Adelson Spent Far More on Campaign than Previously
Known, Huffington Post (Dec. 3, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2012/12/03/sheldon-adelson-2012-election_n_2223589.html.
117
See Bonica et al., supra note 5, at 112–13.
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ficeholders who are disproportionately beholden to a minority of powerful contributors, advocates of finance limits say, will shirk their responsibilities to their other constituents . . . .” 118 She also recognizes that
alignment is linked to a specific democratic theory: “a populist view in
which the representative ought be as close as possible to a transparent
vehicle for plebiscitary democracy.” 119 But this link is precisely the
problem, in her view. “[S]electing one vision of good government is not
generally an acceptable justification for limiting speech . . . . [Alignment] claims the superiority of a particular conception of democracy as
a ground for limiting speech.” 120 In other words, the democratic origin of
the alignment interest is not the core of its appeal but rather its fatal
flaw.
Sullivan is correct that the primary reason for a jurisdiction to invoke
alignment is that it is drawn to the theory of democracy that alignment
represents. But she is wrong to suppose that there is anything illegitimate about a jurisdiction embracing a particular democratic theory. In
fact, jurisdictions do so all the time, and they then cite these theories as
justifications for burdening a host of individual rights, not just speech.
Take, for example, the myriad requirements that states apply to candidates (especially from minor parties) seeking to be listed on ballots.
These requirements typically are defended on the grounds that they “favor the traditional two-party system” and “temper the destabilizing effects of . . . excessive factionalism”—and they typically are upheld. 121
Or consider the countless districts that deviate at least somewhat from
the rule of one person, one vote. When these districts are contested, jurisdictions argue that the deviations are justified by their interests in

118

Sullivan, supra note 24, at 679.
Id. at 681. This is not quite how I would describe the democratic theories with which
alignment is most consistent. See supra notes 45–51 and accompanying text (explaining how
alignment follows from delegate model of representation and from majoritarianism).
120
Id. at 680–81 (emphasis omitted). Similar arguments can be found in some of the
Court’s recent cases. See, e.g., McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441 (plurality opinion) (“Campaign finance restrictions that pursue other objectives [than preventing corruption], we have
explained, impermissibly inject the Government ‘into the debate over who should govern.’”
(quoting Bennett, 131 S. Ct. at 2826)).
121
Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 367 (1997) (upholding ban on
fusion candidacies); see also, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 439 (1992) (upholding
ban on write-in candidacies based on state’s interest in avoiding “unrestrained factionalism”); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 761 (1973) (upholding deadline on party enrollment based on state’s interest in “preservation of the integrity of the electoral process”).
119
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compactness, congruence with political subdivisions, and the like. 122
And they usually prevail as well. 123
Even in the campaign finance context, it is not only the alignment interest that entails a commitment to a particular vision of democracy. The
anti-corruption and informational interests, which Sullivan omits from
her analysis, do so too. In a recent article, Deborah Hellman explains
that corruption is a “derivative concept” that is meaningful only if one
first adopts a theory of how an uncorrupted individual or institution
would act. 124 When the relevant individual is an officeholder and the relevant institution is a legislature, “[w]hat constitutes political corruption . . . depends on a theory of democracy.” 125 What constitutes corruption, that is, depends on precisely the issue that Sullivan deems offlimits. 126 Likewise, the rationale for notifying voters about the sources of
campaign messages is, in the Court’s words, to “enable[] the electorate
to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers . . . .” 127 This aim also rests on a contested view of how democracy
should operate—as evidenced by the fact that at least one Justice disagrees with the Court’s position. 128
122

See, e.g., Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 161–62 (1993) (upholding malapportioned districts resulting from “policy in favor of preserving county boundaries”); White v.
Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 764–75 & n.8 (1973) (same); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 323
(1973) (same where state “sought to avoid the fragmentation of such subdivisions”).
123
See Action on Redistricting Plans, 2001-07, Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures (Jan. 9,
2008, 9:08 PM), http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/departments/scr/redist/redsum2000/
action2000.htm (showing that majority of redistricting lawsuits failed in 2000s cycle); see
also Briffault, supra note 63, at 1767–68 (“[W]hat is striking about the jurisprudence of elections is the Court’s willingness to let legislatures determine some of the substantive values
that election rules may advance . . . .”).
124
Deborah Hellman, Defining Corruption and Constitutionalizing Democracy, 111 Mich.
L. Rev. 1385, 1389 (2013).
125
Id. at 1394; see also Thomas F. Burke, The Concept of Corruption in Campaign Finance Law, 14 Const. Comment. 127, 128 (1997) (“Any adequate standard of corruption . . .
must be grounded in a convincing theory of representation.”).
126
Because Hellman is wary of having the Court select a theory of democracy, she argues
for judicial deference to the elected branches’ conception of corruption. See Hellman, supra
note 124, at 1410–11. This, of course, is almost the exact opposite of Sullivan’s position.
Sullivan believes that the elected branches should not choose a theory of democracy at all.
Hellman believes that only the elected branches should make this choice.
127
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916.
128
See id. at 979–82 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that
disclosure requirements are unconstitutional because they abridge right to anonymous
speech). Moreover, as soon as the Court recognizes an interest asserted by a jurisdiction, it
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Sullivan might respond that the anti-corruption and informational interests are invalid as well. 129 Perhaps money in politics should be deregulated entirely so as to prevent jurisdictions from picking among democratic theories. But even complete deregulation would not get us out of
the theoretical box. If there were no campaign finance restrictions at all,
individuals and groups would try to influence elections in whatever
manner they thought was most beneficial to their interests. Candidates
then would be elected, and policies enacted, based on the interplay of all
of these individuals’ and groups’ activities. 130 But this is not a description of a political process divorced from democratic theory. Rather, it is
an account of some kind of pluralism—“the aggregation of selfregarding interests, each of which is free to seek as much representation
as possible,” as Sullivan puts it. 131 Deregulation thus involves exactly
the same sort of democratic choice as regulation.
Next, Post sets forth a complex theory of the First Amendment that
distinguishes between the general domain of public discourse and an array of specific managerial domains. In public discourse, people freely
“participat[e] in the ongoing and never-ending formation of public opinion,” 132 and so come to “believe that government is potentially responsive to their views.” 133 Post refers to this belief in the government’s responsiveness as “democratic legitimation,” and he considers its creation
the central purpose of public discourse. 134 In a managerial domain, on
the other hand, “speech may be regulated in order to achieve the instrumental goals of the domain.” 135 In the managerial domain of elections,
for instance, Post posits the goal of “electoral integrity,” by which he

too necessarily adopts a specific theory of democracy. See Hellman, supra note 124, at 1402
(“[W]hen the Court defines corruption, it inescapably puts forward a conception of the proper role of a legislator in a democracy.”).
129
Indeed, she gestures in this direction when she criticizes contribution limits on the
ground that “contributions may be consistent with some notions of democratic theory.” Sullivan, supra note 24, at 681 n.56.
130
The actual preferences of voters also would play some role, even in a wholly deregulated system.
131
Sullivan, supra note 24, at 681; see also id. (“Campaign finance reformers necessarily
reject pluralist assumptions about the operation of democracy . . . .”).
132
Post, supra note 25, at 36.
133
Id. at 49.
134
See id.
135
Id. at 81.
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means elections that produce “popular trust that representatives are responsive to public opinion.” 136
Assuming that campaign speech is part of public discourse, then, the
problem with the alignment approach is that it requires public opinion to
be measured and then compared to some governmental output. But public discourse “conceptualizes public opinion as a continuous process,” as
an “unending unfolding” that “can never be decisively known or
fixed.” 137 Therefore any effort to gauge (and then apply) public opinion
is doomed. “There is . . . no ‘baseline’ from which [misalignment] can
be assessed . . . no Archimedean point[] from which to normalize the
content of public opinion.” 138
Post’s conception of public opinion warrants several responses. First,
as an empirical matter, political scientists have found that it is not nearly
as volatile as he suggests. One landmark study, for example, concluded
that Americans’ policy preferences “form meaningful patterns consistent
with a set of underlying beliefs and values” and “do not in fact change in
a capricious, whimsical, or evanescent fashion.” 139 Second, even if public opinion is highly fluid, the applicability of the alignment approach is
not undermined as a result. The approach holds that voters’ views and
governmental outputs should be congruent over time. If voters’ views
change from one period to the next, then so should the outputs. The approach can cope with shifting public opinion. 140 And third, Post repeatedly argues that there is no way to tell if public opinion is “distorted”—
indeed, this is the thrust of his critique. 141 But the concept of alignment
does not rely on a notion of “undistorted” public opinion. It takes public

136

Id. at 66.
Id. at 53–54.
138
Id.; see also id. at 156 (claiming that alignment approach “has no intrinsic answer to the
obvious question: Who are the People?”).
139
Benjamin I. Page & Robert Y. Shapiro, The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in
Americans’ Policy Preferences 384–85 (1992); see also, e.g., Stuart N. Soroka & Christopher Wlezien, On the Limits to Inequality in Representation, 41 PS: Pol. Sci. & Pol. 319,
319–25 (2008) (showing respondents’ coherent and stable preferences for taxing and spending levels over time); Joseph Daniel Ura & Christopher R. Ellis, Income, Preferences, and
the Dynamics of Policy Responsiveness, 41 PS: Pol. Sci. & Pol. 785, 787–89 (2008) (showing same for respondents’ overall policy liberalism).
140
See Stephanopoulos, supra note 17, at 312–13.
141
See, e.g., Post, supra note 25, at 54 (“[L]imiting speech to prevent distortion is equivalent to freezing public opinion and preventing it from changing in response to new ideas and
new convictions.”).
137
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opinion as it finds it, and merely claims that officeholders’ positions and
policy outcomes should correspond to it. 142
A different kind of answer to Post focuses not on public opinion but
rather on the value of democratic legitimation that underpins public discourse. Democratic legitimation, crucially, is in essence a subjective
form of alignment. It is people’s belief that government is responsive to
their views, while alignment is the reality of a responsive government. 143
Subjective and objective alignment may diverge, of course, but the more
reasonable hypothesis (in the absence of empirical evidence) is that they
typically coincide. 144 It is hard to imagine, after all, what could be more
likely to produce a feeling of alignment than actual alignment. As Justice Stevens remarked in Citizens United, a “[g]overnment captured by
corporate interests,” and so misaligned in their favor, also may cause
people to “believe” that it is “neither responsive to their needs nor willing to give their views a fair hearing.” 145 Accordingly, it may be possible
to reconcile Post’s theoretical framework with the alignment approach in
a fairly straightforward fashion. If public discourse sometimes may be
regulated for the sake of democratic legitimation, perhaps it also may be
regulated for the sake of the alignment from which legitimation arises. 146
A final reply to Post builds on his observation that campaign speech
could be conceptualized not as part of public discourse but instead as
part of the managerial domain of elections. This domain’s boundaries
are elastic, and, in Post’s words, they could be “enlarged to authorize
142
The one exception is the category of misalignment that hinges on divergence from the
hypothetical voter exposed to more even campaign outlays. I concede, however, that this
type of misalignment is not a legitimate concern under current law. See supra notes 41–42
and accompanying text.
143
See supra notes 133–134 and accompanying text. I note that I am treating alignment
and responsiveness as synonymous here, while in fact they have different technical definitions. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 17, at 299–302 (discussing these concepts’ differences).
144
Because it only has become possible very recently to measure objective alignment, no
study to date has investigated the relationship between it and subjective alignment (which
can be assessed using polls).
145
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 974 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(emphasis added); see also Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 507–08 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that “integrity . . . of democratic government” is “derived from the responsiveness of
its law to the interests of citizens”).
146
Post partially concedes this point when he observes that “there might be little difference” between his own framework and something akin to the alignment approach. Post, supra note 25, at 156. They may be “simply using different words to describe the identical
phenomenon.” Id.
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control of [money in politics] that threaten[s] electoral integrity.” 147 If
the proper rubric is the electoral domain, not public discourse, then there
are two further ways to reconcile Post’s theory with the alignment approach. First, the goal Post specifies for the domain, electoral integrity,
is very similar to the value of democratic legitimation that is secured by
public discourse. (The only difference between them is that integrity relies on elections to produce a sense of responsiveness, while legitimation
relies on civic participation. 148) Consequently, if alignment can function
as a means for achieving legitimation in the realm of public discourse, it
should be able to do the same for integrity in the electoral domain. There
is no reason to expect alignment to have different connections to these
highly related, almost equivalent, aims.
Second, once we find ourselves in the electoral domain, Post’s goal of
electoral integrity is entitled to no particular deference. The ends of
managerial domains are “democratically determined,” 149 and there is no
evidence that the public prefers integrity over, say, alignment. In fact,
while I am aware of no polling on the popularity of integrity, two recent
surveys found that a substantial majority of Americans support the delegate model of representation (to which alignment is closely tied) over
the trustee model. 150 The democratic legitimacy of alignment thus is at
least as robust as that of integrity.
Moreover, putting aside the vagaries of public opinion, electoral integrity is an odd choice for an objective because it does not appear to be
linked to any aspect of campaign finance. Political scientists have detected no relationship whatsoever between levels of electoral spending
or types of electoral regulation and people’s trust in government (a passable proxy for integrity). 151 In contrast, as detailed in Part III, both levels
147

Id. at 91; see also Briffault, supra note 63, at 1763 (arguing for “a distinctive jurisprudential regime for election speech”); Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and the First Amendment, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 1803, 1817 (1999) (also arguing for
electoral domain detached from general First Amendment principles).
148
See supra notes 133–134, 136 and accompanying text.
149
Post, supra note 25, at 81.
150
See Kay Lehman Schlozman et al., The Unheavenly Chorus: Unequal Political Voice
and the Broken Promise of American Democracy 59 (2012); Mollyann Brodie et al., Polling
and Democracy: “The Will of the People,” Pub. Persp., July/Aug. 2001, at 1, 12; see also
Cain, supra note 63, at 121 (referring to “more widely accepted[] delegate model”).
151
See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Citizens Deflected: Electoral Integrity and Political Reform, in Citizens Divided, supra note 25, at 141, 144; Nathaniel Persily & Kelli Lammie,
Perceptions of Corruption and Campaign Finance: When Public Opinion Determines Constitutional Law, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 119, 122 (2004) (finding that “trends in general attitudes of
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of spending and types of regulation are connected to alignment in intuitive and empirically verifiable ways. 152 Alignment thus has a clear practical advantage over integrity. Unlike integrity, it indeed is threatened by
money in politics, and promoted by certain kinds of reform.
II. THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF ALIGNMENT
Even if the alignment interest is permitted by First Amendment theory, it is not yet out of the conceptual minefield. The possibility remains
that it might be indistinguishable from one of the multiple interests the
Court has either rejected or downplayed in its campaign finance decisions. In this case, the theoretical availability of alignment would be irrelevant. In order to recognize it, the Court would be obligated to overturn its precedents and to resuscitate one of the stricken interests—in
short, to launch a doctrinal revolution. Even for a future Court more
amenable to regulation than the current Justices, this would be a tall order.
In this Part, then, I explain why alignment is distinct from the three
key interests—anti-corruption, anti-distortion, and equality—that have
made appearances in the Court’s case law. 153 First, as to corruption,
there simply is no connection between misalignment and quid pro quo
corruption (the only variant accepted by today’s Court). Misalignment is
more closely related to undue influence corruption (endorsed by the
Court in the early 2000s), but it still is not the same thing. The undue influence of donors is, at most, one of several means that can produce the
end of misalignment. Second, as to distortion, the term (as used by the
Court) refers to the skewing of electoral outcomes due to asymmetric

corruption seem unrelated to anything happening in the campaign finance system”); David
M. Primo, Public Opinion and Campaign Finance: Reformers Versus Reality, 7 Indep. Rev.
207, 215 (2002) (finding no relationship between trust in government and campaign spending). There also is no obvious connection between campaign finance and people’s belief that
government listens to their views. Indeed, “[p]ublic belief in the responsiveness of the government appears to have risen during a period of increased campaign spending and soft
money fundraising.” John Samples, The Fallacy of Campaign Finance Reform 115 (2006)
(emphasis added); see also Shaun Bowler & Todd Donovan, The Limits of Electoral Reform
88–94 (2013) (finding that public’s attitudes toward political system are largely unaffected
by campaign finance reforms).
152
See infra Part III.
153
Presumably, no one would claim that alignment is identical to the informational interest
that the Court has recognized. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914–16 (2010)
(discussing this interest).
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campaign spending. It has nothing to do with how money in politics may
affect officeholders’ positions or policy outcomes.
And third, equality comes in various forms, but none of them is synonymous with alignment. Equality of candidate resources is an entirely
orthogonal goal; there is no reason why evenly funded candidates should
be any more aligned with voters than unevenly funded ones. Equality of
representation actually is inconsistent with alignment. For there to be
any kind of congruence with the median voter, there must be noncongruence with voters at all other points in the spectrum. And equality
of voter influence may be conducive to the achievement of alignment,
but it too is one of several possible means, not the end itself. It also is
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for alignment to be realized.
A. Anti-Corruption
The prevention of corruption is, without a doubt, the most prominent
interest in the campaign finance case law. On one occasion, the Court
even labeled it “the only legitimate and compelling government interest[] thus far identified for restricting campaign finances.” 154 However,
the prominence of the anti-corruption interest is matched by the Court’s
vacillation over how best to construe it. In Buckley itself and for about a
decade thereafter, the Court mostly limited the concept to quid pro quo
corruption—the explicit exchange of “dollars for political favors.” 155 In
the early 2000s, the Court broadened its definition to include “undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment.” 156 It was in this period that the
Court acknowledged “the broader threat from politicians too compliant
with the wishes of large contributors” 157 and “the danger that officeholders will decide issues . . . according to the wishes of those who have

154

FEC v. NCPAC, 470 U.S. 480, 496–97 (1985).
Id. at 497; see also, e.g., id. (“The hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro
quo . . . .”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26–27 (1976) (per curiam) (“To the extent that
large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo . . . the integrity of our system
of representative democracy is undermined.”). Hints of a broader notion of corruption, however, can be found even in these early cases. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 788 n.26 (1978) (referring to “corruption of elected representatives through
the creation of political debts”); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 70 (discussing “[t]he Government’s
interest in deterring . . . the undue influence of large contributors on officeholders”).
156
FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 441 (2001).
157
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000).
155
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made large financial contributions.” 158 And, coming full circle, the Court
has reverted to its quid pro quo conception over the last few years. In
McCutcheon, the Court baldly declared that “Congress may target only a
specific type of corruption—‘quid pro quo’ corruption.” 159
What is the relationship, then, between alignment and quid pro quo
corruption? In brief, there is (next to) none. Alignment refers to the congruence of voters’ policy preferences with representatives’ positions or
enacted policy. 160 Quid pro quo corruption refers to transactions in
which money (or some other tangible asset) is traded overtly for a politician’s vote (or some other beneficial action). 161 The two concepts are
wholly unrelated. The former is concerned with the level of correspondence between a given popular input and a given governmental output.
The latter scrutinizes how exactly a politician is paying back someone
who has given her something of value. Unfortunately for the alignment
interest, it cannot be shoehorned into the one rationale for campaign finance regulation that the current Court unquestionably accepts.
The reason there may be a hint of a connection between the two concepts is that quid pro quo corruption may give rise to misalignment. If a
politician votes a certain way because of a monetary benefit she received, but would have cast a different and more congruent vote had she
not received the benefit, then the quid pro quo exchange induced the
non-congruence. But, as noted earlier, quid pro quo corruption appears
to be quite rare in contemporary America. 162 The misaligning effect it
could have on the political process thus is relatively limited.
In contrast, alignment has a much stronger link to undue influence
corruption. To say that politicians are “too compliant with” their contributors’ preferences, 163 and inclined to “decide issues . . . according to”
them, 164 in essence is to say that politicians’ and donors’ positions are
aligned. And as long as donors and voters have divergent views, politi158

McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 153 (2003).
McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1450 (2014) (plurality opinion); see also, e.g.,
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 909 (2010) (stating that anti-corruption interest is
“limited to quid pro quo corruption”); FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 478–79
(2007) (plurality opinion).
160
See supra notes 39–44 and accompanying text.
161
See supra note 155 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Burke, supra note 125, at 130
(referring to quid pro quo corruption as “trades of votes for money”); Yasmin Dawood,
Classifying Corruption, 9 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. Pol’y 103, 122 (2014) (same).
162
See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text.
163
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000).
164
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 153 (2003).
159
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cians who are aligned with the former must be misaligned with the latter.
To be unduly influenced by donors means not to be influenced enough
by voters. 165 It is because of this tight connection that I earlier cited the
Court’s undue influence cases as the best evidence of the alignment approach in the Court’s doctrine. 166 If a future Court were ever to adopt the
approach, it likely would rely heavily on these decisions.
But despite these parallels, misalignment and undue influence corruption are not identical. First, even if contributors’ undue influence is the
only mechanism that results in misalignment, it remains just that: a
mechanism, not the outcome itself. The Court thus could recognize
alignment as a compelling interest without having to revise its conception of corruption. Ends are different from means. Second, contributors’
undue influence is not, of course, the only mechanism that generates
misalignment. Within the campaign finance field, it is not just donors
but also spenders who may have a misaligning impact. If candidates
align their positions with those of spenders who advocate for their elections, then misalignment ensues without any undue influence by donors.
And outside the realm of money in politics, there exist a host of additional misaligning forces. Even in the absence of any undue influence,
partisan pressures, legislative rules, gerrymandered districts, and so on
would still cause significant non-congruence. 167
Third, contributors’ undue influence does not even necessarily produce misalignment. If donors and voters have the same policy preferences, then extra sway for donors does not translate into diminished pull
for voters. As discussed in Part III, donors and voters typically do not
have the same ideal point distributions 168—but the fact that donors’ undue influence would not give rise to misalignment if they did further
demonstrates that the concepts are distinct. And fourth, at least in my
view, the terminology of alignment is substantially clearer than that of
undue influence. The Court’s phrase does not tell us how much influence is due to donors, nor does it help with the measurement of either
donors’ or voters’ hold over politicians. Alignment, on the other hand,
plainly calls for the comparison of voters’ policy preferences with of165

See Dawood, supra note 161, at 125 (“The wrong of undue influence . . . is that elected
officials are disproportionately responsive to the wishes of large donors as compared to other
constituents.”).
166
See supra notes 83–89 and accompanying text.
167
See Stephanopoulos, supra note 17, at 323–36, 342–56, 360–65.
168
See infra Part III.
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ficeholders’ positions and actual policy outcomes. Both the inputs and
the outputs in this formulation can be quantified and then matched
against each other. 169
All of this analysis also applies to a version of the anti-corruption interest recently introduced by Lessig. He begins with the premise that
representatives (especially members of the U.S. House) are meant to be
“dependent on the people alone.” 170 But because of their unending need
for campaign funds, they now are dependent on not just the people but
also the donors who supply these funds. 171 The result is a “dependence
corruption” in which elected officials who are supposed to depend exclusively on one body (“the people”) also have become dependent on
another (“the funders”). 172 In Lessig’s view, the governmental interest in
preventing dependence corruption is compelling, and it justifies regulations including contribution limits and public financing (but not expenditure limits). 173
Like undue influence corruption, dependence corruption is closely
tied to misalignment. When politicians are dependent on donors, they
are likely to be aligned with them, and so misaligned with voters. 174 But
like undue influence corruption, dependence corruption also is not
equivalent to misalignment. In fact, all four of the distinctions between
undue influence corruption and misalignment also apply to dependence
corruption. First, dependence on donors is one way in which misalignment can arise. It is not the end itself. Second, donor dependence is not
the only way in which misalignment can arise. Spender dependence can
be just as misaligning as donor dependence. 175 Third, donor dependence
169

See infra Part III; see also supra notes 57–62 and accompanying text.
Lawrence Lessig, What an Originalist Would Understand “Corruption” to Mean, 102
Calif. L. Rev. 1, 7 (2014) (quoting The Federalist No. 52, at 243 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961)).
171
See id.; see also Lawrence Lessig, A Reply to Professor Hasen, 126 Harv. L. Rev. F.
61, 65 (2013) (“Politicians in our system have become dependent upon their funders. Their
‘funders’ are not ‘the people.’”).
172
See Lessig, supra note 171, at 65.
173
See Lessig, supra note 170, at 19 (noting that “compelling interest” “would obviously
support public funding systems” and “would plainly justify aggregate contribution limits”);
id. at 20–21 (noting that interest “would not revive Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce” and “would also not reverse Citizens United v. FEC”).
174
See Lessig, supra note 171, at 68 (explaining that dependence corruption makes “representatives responsive to funders first, and only then to citizens”).
175
See Bruce E. Cain, Is “Dependence Corruption” the Solution to America’s Campaign
Finance Problems?, 102 Calif. L. Rev. 37, 43 (2014) (pointing out that “outside spending
often reinforces a very specific connection between the candidate’s successful election and
170
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does not necessarily produce misalignment. As Lessig notes, if donors
and voters have the same preferences, then “a dependence upon ‘contributors’ could in effect be the same as a dependence upon voters.” 176
And fourth, dependence corruption does not convert easily into a doctrinal standard. It provides no guidance as to how dependence (on donors
or on voters) actually is to be assessed. 177
A final divergence between misalignment and dependence corruption
relates to their policy prescriptions. Both theories support the validity of
contribution limits on individuals (which are aligning and also reduce
politicians’ dependence on donors). 178 But Lessig states that his approach would uphold public financing programs, while the alignment
approach would not shield the many such programs whose effects are
ambiguous or misaligning. 179 Lessig also maintains that his approach
would not ratify expenditure limits, while the alignment approach would
permit them if their impact is aligning. 180 Accordingly, the contrasts between the methods are not so many angels dancing on the head of a pin.
They are distinctions that make a difference.
B. Anti-Distortion
A second interest that has appeared in the campaign finance case law
is the prevention of electoral distortion. This interest first emerged in
pre-Buckley decisions such as Automobile Workers, in which the Court
expressed concern about the “deleterious influences on federal elections
resulting from . . . large aggregations of capital.” 181 It also turned up in
decisions in the first decade after Buckley, in which the Court worried
that the “corrosive influence of concentrated corporate wealth” would

the group’s interests and issues”); Richard L. Hasen, Super PAC Contributions, Corruption,
and the Proxy War over Coordination, 9 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. Pol’y 1, 2 (2014).
176
Lessig, supra note 63, at 243.
177
See Cain, supra note 175, at 44 (“Would the empirical evidence for dependence corruption be easier to find than quid pro quo corruption? I doubt it.”). Lessig’s one suggestion for
how to measure dependence is to examine the time candidates spend fundraising. See Lessig,
supra note 171, at 65.
178
See supra note 173; see also infra Part IV.
179
See supra note 173; see also infra Part IV.
180
See supra note 173; see also infra Part IV.
181
United States v. Auto. Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 585 (1957); see also, e.g., Pipefitters
Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 416 (1972) (noting interest in “eliminat[ing] the effect of aggregated wealth on federal elections”); United States v. C.I.O., 335
U.S. 106, 115 (1948).

COPYRIGHT © 2015, VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

1460

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 101:1425

undermine the “integrity of the marketplace of political ideas.” 182 But
the interest did not come into its own until the 1990 case of Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 183 which upheld Michigan’s ban on
campaign expenditures by corporations. The Court famously expounded
on the “corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of
wealth . . . that have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the
corporation’s political ideas.” 184 Austin, however, stood for only two
decades. Its holding that corporate expenditures could be limited was reversed in Citizens United—and the anti-distortion interest on which its
holding rested was rejected as well. 185
For present purposes, the crucial point about distortion is that, at least
as understood by the Court, it refers to the skewing of electoral outcomes due to large expenditures. Distortion occurs, in the Court’s view,
when wealthy entities spend heavily during a campaign and thus induce
some number of voters to cast their ballots differently than they would
have under conditions of more even outlays. This conception explains
why the Austin Court concluded its opinion by warning of the “threat
that huge corporate treasuries . . . will be used to influence unfairly the
outcome of elections.” 186 It also explains why the Court, in other cases,
highlighted the “governmental interest in reducing . . . the influence of
wealth on the outcomes of elections” 187 and the risk that “wealthy and
powerful” entities “may drown out other points of view” and “exert an
undue influence on the outcome of a . . . vote.” 188 As Julian Eule has observed, Austin’s theory was that “corporations spoke too loudly and
wielded too much influence on the electorate.” 189

182

FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986); see, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of
Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789 (1978).
183
494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
184
Austin, 494 U.S. at 660. The Court dubbed this distortion “a different type of corruption
in the political arena.” Id.
185
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 903–08.
186
Austin, 494 U.S. at 669.
187
Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 755 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); see, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 274 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he ‘corrosive and distorting effects’ described
in Austin are that corporations . . . will be able to convince voters of the correctness of their
ideas.”).
188
First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789 (1978) (noting this risk but not
finding it present on facts of case).
189
Julian N. Eule, Promoting Speaker Diversity: Austin and Metro Broadcasting, 1990
Sup. Ct. Rev. 105, 109; see, e.g., Briffault, supra note 32, at 922 (“Austin was rooted in con-
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The definition of distortion matters because if the term denotes the
skewing of electoral outcomes due to large expenditures, then it does not
denote misalignment. Misalignment, again, is the lack of fit between
voters’ policy preferences and key governmental outputs. It accepts voters’ preferences as they are, without seeking to convert them to some
sort of pure or unadulterated state. 190 It also compares voters’ preferences to products of the political process such as officeholders’ positions
and actual policy outcomes. In contrast, Austin-style distortion does not
take voters’ views as it finds them. Its central aim is to determine how
asymmetric spending changes these views relative to a hypothetical
benchmark of more even outlays. 191 Austin-style distortion also is indifferent to the positions that representatives adopt and the policies that in
fact are enacted. Public opinion is its sole focus—not, as with misalignment, merely one side of the equation. Accordingly, it seems clear that
Austin-style distortion and misalignment are not the same thing. The
former cares only about the effect of campaign money on voters; the latter only about its impact on officeholders. 192
To be sure, Austin-style distortion is not the only kind of distortion
that one could imagine. 193 For instance, one could define an aligned political system—a system in which voters’ policy preferences are congruent with key governmental outputs—as an undistorted state. Then any
divergence from this state (that is, any misalignment) would constitute
distortion. 194 But the availability of such conceptual moves is not particularly relevant. The anti-distortion interest does not encompass every
cern to protect the political equality of voters from corporate war chests . . . .”); Issacharoff,
supra note 63, at 122; Lessig, supra note 170, at 12.
190
But see supra notes 41–42 (discussing another form of misalignment, not advocated
here, that does involve distortion of voters’ preferences due to uneven spending).
191
See Sullivan, supra note 24, at 677 (“[T]he concept of ‘distortion’ assumes a baseline of
‘undistorted’ voter views and preferences.”).
192
Cf. Lessig, supra note 170, at 15 (also distinguishing between “two paradigms—
regulating speech that corrupts government officials (constitutional) and regulating speech
said to corrupt citizens (unconstitutional)”).
193
See Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment and
Campaign Finance Reform, 73 Calif. L. Rev. 1045, 1078 (1985) (noting indeterminacy of
concept of distortion); David Cole, First Amendment Antitrust: The End of Laissez-Faire in
Campaign Finance, 9 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 236, 277 (1991) (“The problem, of course, is in
defining when the marketplace is . . . ‘distorted’ . . . .”).
194
Cf. Richard L. Hasen, Fixing Washington, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 550, 572 (2012) (book
review) (claiming that “Lessig’s idea that campaign money distorts policy outcomes sounds
very much like the language used by the Supreme Court in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce”).
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sort of skew that a commentator can concoct. Rather, it includes only the
specific phenomenon that the Court has described in its decisions on
money in politics: the shifting of voters’ preferences as a result of lopsided campaign spending. Whatever the case may be for other types of
distortion, this phenomenon simply is not misalignment. 195
C. Equality
The final interest in the campaign finance case law—one long championed by liberals 196 but never accepted by a majority of the Court—is
equality. In Buckley, the Court considered equality justifications for expenditure limits on candidates and on individuals. 197 It spurned the justifications in both cases, declaring in perhaps the field’s best-known line
that “the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is
wholly foreign to the First Amendment.” 198 The Court adhered to its position on candidate equality in subsequent cases such as Davis v. FEC 199
and Bennett. In Bennett, faced with a “trigger” provision that allocated
matching funds to publicly financed candidates if their opponents spent
heavily, the Court commented that “it is not legitimate for the government to attempt to equalize electoral opportunities in this manner.”200
The Court also stuck to its guns on individual equality in Citizens United. Quoting Buckley, it reaffirmed that “the Government has [no] interest ‘in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections.’” 201

195

Cf. Hasen, supra note 27, at 311 (conceding that Lessig’s position “differs in some particulars from the equality argument in Austin”).
196
See, e.g., Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-per-Voter: A Constitutional Principle of
Campaign Finance, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1204, 1204 (1994); Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz,
The Constitutional Imperative and Practical Superiority of Democratically Financed Elections, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1160, 1162 (1994); Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1390, 1392 (1994).
197
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 439–59 (1976) (per curiam).
198
Id. at 48–49; see also id. at 49 n.55 (rejecting position that “First Amendment permits
Congress to abridge the rights of some persons to engage in political expression in order to
enhance the relative voice of other segments of our society”).
199
554 U.S. 724 (2008).
200
Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2826 (2011);
see also Davis, 554 U.S. at 742 (“The argument that a candidate’s speech may be restricted
in order to ‘level electoral opportunities’ has ominous implications . . . .”).
201
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48).
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From these decisions (as well as the academic literature), we can
glean three kinds of equality. The first is equality of candidate resources,
referred to by Hasen and Daniel Lowenstein as equality of outputs. 202
This sort of equality is present when candidates have the same amount
of money to spend in their campaigns, but is absent when one candidate
enjoys a financial advantage over her opponent. The second, only hinted
at in the doctrine but developed more fully by scholars such as Yasmin
Dawood and Sullivan, is equality of representation. This variant exists
when every voter is represented equally, but not when “elected officials
are disproportionately responsive” to their constituents. 203 And the third
is equality of voter influence over the political process, dubbed equality
of inputs by Hasen and Lowenstein. 204 Voters have equal influence (at
least from a financial perspective) when they each are able to donate and
spend the same amount of money. But they lack it when some voters are
able to deploy greater resources than others.
Are any of these forms of equality equivalent to alignment? If so, then
alignment would be an illegitimate interest under the Court’s precedent,
but I believe the answer is no. To begin with, equality of candidate resources (that is, output equality) is an essentially unrelated concept. A
candidate may disburse just as much money as her opponent during a
campaign, but then flout her constituents’ preferences once in office.
Conversely, a candidate may outspend her opponent (or be outspent),
but then abide by voters’ wishes after being elected. There is no logical
link between a candidate’s relative spending and her subsequent alignment with her constituents. In fact, there is not even much of a correlation between these variables. Even if equal spending produces morecompetitive races, candidates who squeak into office are only barely
more aligned with voters than candidates who prevail in landslides. 205 In

202

See Hasen, supra note 27, at 312; Daniel Hays Lowenstein, A Patternless Mosaic:
Campaign Finance and the First Amendment After Austin, 21 Cap. U. L. Rev. 381, 394
(1992).
203
Dawood, supra note 161, at 125; see also Sullivan, supra note 24, at 678 (referring to
“legislators’ unequal responsiveness to different citizens”).
204
See Hasen, supra note 27, at 312; Lowenstein, supra note 202, at 393.
205
See Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Candidate Positioning in U.S. House Elections, 45
Am. J. Pol. Sci. 136, 145 (2001) (finding that shift from 30% margin of victory to perfect tie
increases candidate convergence by only 0.069 points on 0 to 1 scale); Thomas L. Brunell &
Bernard Grofman, Evaluating the Impact of Redistricting on District Homogeneity, Political
Competition, and Political Extremism in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1962 to 2006, in
Designing Democratic Government: Making Institutions Work 117, 131–32 (Margaret Levi
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addition, the effect of public financing systems that equalize candidate
resources has been to increase misalignment, not to reduce it. 206
Next, equality of representation actually is profoundly at odds with
alignment. Alignment is the congruence of governmental outputs with
the views of the median voter. As long as voters diverge in their opinions, such congruence can be achieved only if there is non-congruence
with the views of voters at all other points in the distribution. Alignment
at the median requires misalignment at all other locations. Moreover,
this conclusion holds even if we use Dawood or Sullivan’s formulation
of equal responsiveness. 207 When the preferences of the median voter
change, governmental outputs must change in tandem in order to maintain alignment. But when voters’ preferences shift without affecting the
position of the median, governmental outputs must not shift at all.
Alignment thus is possible only if “elected officials” indeed “are disproportionately responsive” to their constituents. 208
This leaves us with equality of voter influence, which is precisely the
concept that Hasen claims is indistinguishable from alignment. Alignment, in his view, amounts to “a call for equality of political inputs,” an
effort “to reduce the voice of some to enhance the relative voice of others.” 209 Hasen clearly is correct that equality of voter influence and
alignment are related. To see why, assume that candidates’ positions are
entirely a product of the money that voters donate to them or spend on
their behalf. (Assume also that candidates aim to maximize the sum of

et al. eds., 2008) (showing almost no relationship between Democratic share of two-party
House vote and House member’s voting record).
206
See infra Section III.C; see also Lessig, supra note 171, at 66 (explaining that policies
that addressed dependence corruption would not produce “equality of candidate funding” but
rather “government-funded inequality”).
207
See supra note 203 and accompanying text. “[R]esponsiveness differs from alignment
in that it refers to the rate at which these outputs change given some shift in public opinion.
Alignment, in contrast, denotes whether or not the outputs are congruent with the public’s
preferences.” Stephanopoulos, supra note 17, at 301.
208
Dawood, supra note 161, at 125. The implication of this analysis, of course, is that
equal representation is an unattainable ideal. As long as voters do not all share the same
preferences, governmental outputs inevitably will be better aligned with (and more responsive to) some groups’ views than others’. An additional point is that the alignment approach
does treat all voters equally in the initial stage of determining the position of the median. It is
only after this position has been ascertained that the approach begins treating voters unequally.
209
Hasen, supra note 27, at 312 (making this argument with respect to Lessig’s goal of
preventing dependence corruption); see Cain, supra note 175, at 41 (agreeing that “equality
considerations underlie the particular dependency problem that Lessig is concerned with”).
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these donations and expenditures. 210) Under the status quo, different voters deploy vastly different resources, and so candidates’ positions gravitate toward the voters with the most funds to offer. 211 But in a regime in
which all voters offered the same funding possibilities, candidates would
have a powerful incentive to shift their stances toward the median. The
median is where candidates would be able to secure the most money,
and, by stipulation here, resource maximization drives candidate positioning. Alignment thus would follow naturally from equal voter influence. 212
Despite this connection, alignment and equal voter influence are not
equivalent, largely for reasons that have been alluded to already. First,
even if equal voter influence is a necessary and sufficient condition for
alignment to arise, it still is just a condition, not the actual objective. It
may yield alignment by inducing candidates to move toward the median,
but yielding something is not the same as being something. It thus is beside the point that a regulation that promotes equal voter influence also
may promote alignment. As Justice Kagan pointed out in her dissent in
Bennett, “No special rule of automatic invalidation applies to statutes
having some connection to equality; like any other laws, they pass muster when supported by an important enough government interest.” 213
Second, equal voter influence is not a necessary condition for alignment to arise. Imagine that a jurisdiction randomly selects half of its
voters and gives each of them a sum of money that they must donate or
spend during the next campaign. Imagine also that the jurisdiction bans
the other half of its voters from deploying any electoral resources at all.
The inequality of voter influence in this example could not be starker.
Yet alignment still would ensue because candidates still would have a
strong incentive to shift their positions toward the median. The random
selection would make the distribution of subsidized voters identical to
210

Assume further that all campaign resources are supplied by voters (and not by parties,
corporations, unions, etc.).
211
See infra Section III.B.
212
This is a variant of Anthony Downs’s famous argument that vote-maximizing candidates will converge on the median voter. See Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy 114–27 (1957). If candidates’ positions are entirely a function of the funds deployed
on their behalf, and if all voters deploy equal funds, then resource-maximizing candidates
also will converge on the median voter.
213
Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2845 (2011)
(Kagan, J., dissenting); see also Hasen, supra note 27, at 308 (“[A] campaign finance law
justified on [legitimate] grounds should not become unconstitutional if the law incidentally
promotes political equality.”); Lessig, supra note 171, at 66–67.
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that of all voters, and thus would preserve the median as the point at
which candidate funding is maximized. 214
Third, equal voter influence is not a sufficient condition for alignment
either. If candidates’ stances are wholly a function of the funds deployed
by voters on their behalf, and if there are only two candidates in a race,
then convergence at the median occurs under conditions of perfect input
equality. But the introduction of additional candidates causes this relationship to break down. With three or more contestants, resourcemaximizing candidates garner more funds by positioning themselves at
different points along the spectrum, not by clustering in the middle
(where they can be outflanked by their opponents). As Gary Cox has explained, “when there are more than two candidates competing under
[standard American rules], equilibria are noncentrist; rational [resource]seeking politicians have an incentive to avoid bunching at the median.” 215
Finally, the assumption on which the link between equal voter influence and alignment relies—that candidates’ positions stem from the
funds donated to or spent for them by voters, and from nothing else—is
obviously wrong. Candidates’ positions actually stem from all sorts of
other sources too: their own ideologies, their parties’ platforms, franchise and party regulations, the views (rather than dollars) of their primary and general electorates, etc. 216 In the real world, then, alignment
does not necessarily follow from equal voter influence, even if candidates are hungry for resources and there are only two candidates per
race. Equal voter influence may have an aligning effect, but so too may
several other factors, and its impact easily may be offset by forces pushing in the opposite direction. Accordingly, equal voter influence has no
stronger claim to constituting alignment itself than do any of the other
aligning elements that dot the electoral landscape. It simply is one such
element among many. 217
214

This point also stands with respect to certain unequal funding schemes that do not employ random selection. For example, if the half of voters closer to the median received subsidies, and the half of voters farther from it were barred from deploying any resources, then
alignment again would follow despite the inequality.
215
Gary W. Cox, Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems, 34 Am. J.
Pol. Sci. 903, 912 (1990).
216
See Stephanopoulos, supra note 17, at 323–36, 342–56, 360–65.
217
Moreover, even if all of this analysis is unconvincing and equal voter influence still
seems identical to alignment, the Court may be more receptive to arguments about input (rather than output) equality. See Hasen, supra note 65, at 1003; Lowenstein, supra note 202, at
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III. THE EMPIRICS OF ALIGNMENT
It is not enough, though, to show that alignment is conceptually distinct from the anti-corruption, anti-distortion, and equality interests. No
matter which interest is asserted in a campaign finance case, the Court
carefully scrutinizes the connection between the interest and the policy
that is being defended. 218 For alignment to serve as a viable rationale, it
thus must be established that money in politics produces misalignment,
and that the regulation of such money promotes alignment. The burden
of proof also is heavier for alignment than for other, more familiar interests. As the Court made clear in Shrink Missouri, “The quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny . . . will
vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification
raised.” 219
In this Part, then, I survey the empirical evidence on both the misaligning effects of campaign finance and the aligning effects of campaign
finance reform. This evidence—most of which has emerged only in the
last few years 220—falls into three main categories. First, numerous studies examine the relationship between governmental outputs and the preferences of poor, middle-class, and rich Americans. Most of them find
that the outputs are tied more closely to the wishes of the rich than to
those of any other group. Second, a smaller set of studies address the
same issue but with respect to donors as opposed to non-donors. Their
results are even more unequivocal: The influence of donors dwarfs that
of non-donors. And third, a handful of very recent studies explore the

395 (noting that “the [Court’s] hostility seems to have been directed primarily at equality of
outputs”).
218
See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387–88 (2000) (holding that
contribution limits must be “closely drawn” to serve “sufficiently important interest”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44–45 (1976) (applying “exacting scrutiny” to expenditure limits).
219
Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 391; see also Renata Strause & Daniel P. Tokaji, Between Access and Influence: Building a Record for the Next Court, 9 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. Pol’y
211, 214 (2014) (“A strong record is essential both to document the interests served by legislation, and to show that it is appropriately tailored.”); Strauss, supra note 58, at 1388, 1389.
220
A landmark 2005 report lamented that “political scientists have paid less attention to
issues of differential government responsiveness than they should,” and declared that
“[n]owhere is the need for additional, more sophisticated research more obvious than for understanding how . . . flows of money affect U.S. politics and governance.” Lawrence R. Jacobs & Theda Skocpol, Studying Inequality and American Democracy: Findings and Challenges, in Inequality and American Democracy: What We Know and What We Need to
Learn 214, 220, 222 (Lawrence R. Jacobs & Theda Skocpol eds., 2005). Much of the research that I discuss in this Part was undertaken in response to this report.
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implications of campaign finance regulations for alignment. They conclude that individual contribution limits and certain kinds of public financing are aligning, but that party and PAC contribution limits and other kinds of public financing are misaligning. Because of the emphasis
that Shrink Missouri placed on actual data, I review this scholarship at
some length in the pages that follow.
A. The Influence of the Affluent
The topic of differential representation by income group burst onto
the political science stage with the 2008 publication of Larry Bartels’s
Unequal Democracy. 221 Like many scholars before him, Bartels quantified voters’ preferences using survey responses and officeholders’ (here
U.S. senators’) positions using roll call votes. 222 But, unlike most previous work, Bartels did not treat public opinion as a single undifferentiated
mass. Instead, he computed separate estimates of the attitudes of lowincome, middle-income, and high-income respondents. 223 Analyzing the
links between these estimates and senators’ voting records, he found that
the views of the poor exerted no influence whatsoever, the views of the
middle-class exerted a modest influence, and the views of the rich exerted a much greater influence. 224 As he summed up his results (which are
displayed in Figure 2), “senators in this period [1989–1994] were vastly
more responsive to affluent constituents than to constituents of modest
means.” 225
Bartels’s finding of misalignment 226 in favor of the rich subsequently
was extended in multiple directions by other scholars. First, Christopher
Ellis, 227 Jesse Rhodes and Brian Schaffner, 228 and Chris Tausanovitch 229
221

Larry M. Bartels, Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age
(2008) [hereinafter Bartels, Unequal Democracy]. Earlier work by both Bartels and Martin
Gilens also addressed this topic. See Larry M. Bartels, Economic Inequality and Political
Representation (Aug. 2005) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.princeton.edu/~
bartels/economic.pdf); Martin Gilens, Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness, 69 Pub.
Opinion Q. 778 (2005).
222
See Bartels, Unequal Democracy, supra note 221, at 254–55.
223
See id. at 257–58.
224
See id. at 259–62.
225
Id. at 253.
226
Technically, Bartels analyzed responsiveness, not alignment. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 17, at 299–302 (discussing these concepts’ differences).
227
See Christopher Ellis, Social Context and Economic Biases in Representation, 75 J.
Pol. 773, 779 (2013) [hereinafter Ellis, Social Context]; Christopher Ellis, Understanding
Economic Biases in Representation: Income, Resources, and Policy Representation in the

COPYRIGHT © 2015, VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2015]

Aligning Campaign Finance Law

1469

all determined that House members’ voting records also are more responsive to the preferences of the affluent than to those of other individuals. Rhodes, Schaffner, and Tausanovitch generated especially robust
results by using far larger samples than those to which Bartels had access: a private vendor’s database of 265 million people in Rhodes and
Schaffner’s case, 230 and a “super-survey” combining five earlier surveys
in Tausanovitch’s. 231 Ellis, for his part, probed some of the factors that
may explain variations in the level of pro-rich misalignment. He found
that the poor are worst represented “in districts represented by Republicans, in districts with high median incomes, and in districts that are electorally safe.” 232
Second, in his landmark 2012 book, Affluence and Influence, 233 Martin Gilens discovered that there also is outcome (as opposed to preference) misalignment in favor of the wealthy. Gilens compiled responses
to thousands of survey questions over multiple decades, and used these
responses to estimate income groups’ opinions on a host of national policy issues. 234 He then painstakingly tracked whether each policy asked
about by a survey actually was enacted by the federal government during the next four years. 235 With respect to issues about which income
groups disagreed, Gilens found clear responsiveness to the preferences
110th House, 65 Pol. Res. Q. 938, 943 (2012) [hereinafter Ellis, Understanding Biases]; Ellis,
supra note 36, at 7.
228
See Jesse H. Rhodes & Brian F. Schaffner, Economic Inequality and Representation in
the U.S. House: A New Approach Using Population-Level Data 29 (Apr. 7, 2013) (unpublished
manuscript, available at http://people.umass.edu/schaffne/Schaffner.Rhodes.MPSA.2013.pdf).
229
See Chris Tausanovitch, Income and Representation in the United States Congress 22 (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ctausanovitch.com/IncomeRepresentation2013.pdf).
230
See Rhodes & Schaffner, supra note 228, at 2.
231
See Tausanovitch, supra note 229, at 12–13. Tausanovitch also found, however, that if
legislators were equally responsive to all income groups’ preferences, their voting records
would not be dramatically different from the status quo. See id. at 28–32.
232
Ellis, Social Context, supra note 227, at 781; see also Ellis, supra note 36, at 30 (reporting similar results); John D. Griffin & Brian Newman, Voting Power, Policy Representation,
and Disparities in Voting’s Rewards, 75 J. Pol. 52, 56 (2013) (finding that “win ratio” measuring likelihood that member of Congress votes consistent with constituent’s preferences is
about 4.5 points higher for high-income earners than for low-income earners); cf. Lawrence
R. Jacobs & Benjamin I. Page, Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy?, 99 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.
107, 114–15, 117 (2005) (finding that preferences of business leaders have much larger impact on positions of foreign policy officials than do preferences of general public).
233
Martin Gilens, Affluence and Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in
America (2012).
234
See id. at 50–62.
235
See id. at 60.
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of respondents at the ninetieth percentile. As their support for a policy
increased, the odds of the policy’s enactment increased steadily as
well. 236 But Gilens found no responsiveness at all to the preferences of
respondents at the tenth or fiftieth percentiles. 237 As he put it (and as
shown in Figure 2), “when preferences between the well-off and the
poor [or middle-class] diverge, government policy bears absolutely no
relationship to the degree of support or opposition among the poor [or
middle-class].” 238
Figure 2: Findings of Pro-Affluent Misalignment by Bartels 239 and
Gilens 240

236
See id. at 80. Specifically, as the share of respondents at the ninetieth percentile favoring a policy rose from 10% to 90%, the odds of the policy’s enactment rose from 10% to
50%. See id.
237
See id. For respondents at both of these percentiles, the odds of a policy’s enactment
stayed constant at about 30% no matter what share of the respondents supported the policy.
238
Id. at 81; see also Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American
Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 Persp. Pol. 564, 570–75 (2014),
available at http://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/mgilens/files/gilens_and_page_
2014_-testing_theories_of_american_politics.doc.pdf (reporting similar results and also determining that business-oriented interest groups have larger impact on policy enactment than
mass-based groups).
239
Bartels, supra note 221, at 52.
240
Gilens, supra note 233, at 80.
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Third, Patrick Flavin 241 and Elizabeth Rigby and Gerald Wright 242 determined that pro-rich outcome misalignment exists at the state level as
well. Flavin analyzed overall policy liberalism, taking into account state
laws in twenty different domains, as well as a series of hot-button issues
such as the death penalty, abortion, and gun control. 243 In all of these areas, he found that “citizens with low incomes receive little substantive
political representation in the policy decisions made by state governments.” 244 Similarly, Rigby and Wright considered aggregate indices of
state economic and social policy. 245 In both cases, they too discovered
greater responsiveness to the preferences of wealthier individuals. 246
Lastly, Ellis 247 and David Weakliem et al., 248 respectively, studied
how misalignment in favor of the affluent varies temporally and internationally. Ellis calculated the relative proximity to their House members
of individuals in the top income tercile versus individuals in the bottom
income tercile over the 1972–2008 period. 249 He found that the representational advantage enjoyed by the wealthy increased fivefold from the
beginning of this era to the end. 250 Weakliem et al. examined the extent
to which income inequality in other countries reflects the preferences of

241
See Patrick Flavin, Income Inequality and Policy Representation in the American
States, 40 Am. Pol. Res. 29 (2011).
242
See Elizabeth Rigby & Gerald C. Wright, Whose Statehouse Democracy? Policy Responsiveness to Poor Versus Rich Constituents in Poor Versus Rich States, in Who Gets
Represented 189 (Peter K. Enns & Christopher Wlezien eds., 2011).
243
See Flavin, supra note 241, at 40–41.
244
Id. at 44. While the coefficients for low-income opinion were always lower than the
coefficients for middle-income and high-income opinion, the latter two coefficients were not
always distinguishable. See id. at 41–45.
245
See Rigby & Wright, supra note 242, at 195–99.
246
See id. at 217. Like Flavin, Rigby and Wright also sometimes found that the coefficients for middle-income and high-income opinion were indistinguishable. See id. at 207–17.
247
See Ellis, supra note 36.
248
See David L. Weakliem et al., By Popular Demand: The Effect of Public Opinion on
Income Inequality, 4 Comp. Soc. 261 (2005).
249
See Ellis, supra note 36, at 5–10.
250
See id. at 9 (noting that representational gap averaged one point from 1972 to 1994 but
five points in 2004 and 2008). But see Gilens, supra note 233, at 201 (finding that rich-poor
gap with respect to outcome alignment peaked in 1980s and was smaller in earlier and later
years).
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different income groups. 251 They determined that, abroad, the views of
individuals at the eightieth income percentile correspond most closely to
levels of inequality, and the views of individuals at the fiftieth and ninety-ninth percentiles are about equally influential. 252 Pro-rich misalignment thus exists in other countries, but is not as stark as in America. 253
While the conclusion that the rich are better represented than other
classes is widely accepted in the literature, it has been subjected to at
least two critiques. The first is largely data-driven. Scholars such as Peter Enns, Robert Erikson, Stuart Soroka, Joseph Ura, and Christopher
Wlezien have argued that different income groups’ preferences actually
do not diverge very much. 254 If this claim is correct, then alignment
cannot vary significantly by income stratum. 255 But the claim only
seems to be correct with respect to relatively crude measures of people’s preferences, such as their ideological self-placement 256 and their
views on governmental spending by issue area. 257 More sophisticated
metrics that rely on people’s answers to a battery of policy questions,
of the sort employed by Gilens 258 and Tausanovitch 259 in particular, in251

See Weakliem et al., supra note 248, at 265–73.
See id. at 276.
253
Further extensions of Bartels’s initial finding include James N. Druckman & Lawrence
R. Jacobs, Segmented Representation: The Reagan White House and Disproportionate Responsiveness, in Who Gets Represented, supra note 242, at 166, 179–80 (finding that President Reagan’s public statements on economic policy best reflected views of wealthy respondents to administration’s polls), and Elizabeth Rigby & Gerald C. Wright, Political
Parties and Representation of the Poor in the American States, 57 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 552, 557
(2013) (finding that candidates’ positions at all levels are most responsive to preferences of
high-income groups).
254
See Yosef Bhatti & Robert S. Erikson, How Poorly Are the Poor Represented in the
U.S. Senate?, in Who Gets Represented, supra note 242, at 223, 236; Peter K. Enns & Christopher Wlezien, Group Opinion and the Study of Representation, in Who Gets Represented,
supra note 242, at 1, 4–5; Soroka & Wlezien, supra note 139, at 321; Ura & Ellis, supra note
139, at 785; Christopher Wlezien & Stuart N. Soroka, Inequality in Policy Responsiveness,
in Who Gets Represented, supra note 242, at 285, 287.
255
See Bhatti & Erikson, supra note 254, at 233; Soroka & Wlezien, supra note 139, at
325; Ura & Ellis, supra note 139, at 792; Wlezien & Soroka, supra note 254, at 287.
256
See Bhatti & Erikson, supra note 254, at 233 (using this approach); cf. Ura & Ellis, supra note 139, at 788 (using people’s overall policy liberalism).
257
See Enns & Wlezien, supra note 254, at 5 (using this approach); Soroka & Wlezien,
supra note 139, at 321 (same); Wlezien & Soroka, supra note 254, at 287 (same).
258
See Martin Gilens, Preference Gaps and Inequality in Representation, 42 PS: Pol. Sci.
& Pol. 335, 335 (2009) (noting that his “data set of policy preferences across income groups
covers a far broader range of issues and shows dramatically greater differences between the
preferences of low- and high-income Americans”).
259
See Tausanovitch, supra note 229, at 15 (explaining that ideal points calculated using
array of policy questions “give[] us more information about the location of individuals in the
policy space” than ideological self-placements); see also Patrick Flavin, Differences in Poli252
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deed find substantial differences between income groups’ preferences.
The data-driven objection thus appears to be an artifact of less advanced approaches to ascertaining public opinion.
The second critique is that even if there is misalignment in favor of
the rich, it could result from their higher level of non-monetary participation (e.g., voting, volunteering, attending meetings, contacting officials, etc.). 260 In this case, the misalignment would be the product not of
money in politics but rather of heightened civic engagement—generally
considered a good thing. This possibility, though, has been considered
explicitly, and then rejected, by both Bartels and Ellis. 261 These scholars
ran models in which they included controls for several forms of nonmonetary participation (as well as respondents’ education and
knowledge). 262 These variables often were associated with higher levels
of alignment, but their inclusion never eliminated (or even much dampened) the statistical significance of income. 263 In Bartels’s words,
“[s]ignificant disparities in responsiveness to rich and poor constituents
do still appear even after allowing for differences attributable to turnout,
knowledge, and contacting.” 264
The inference that Bartels drew from this result is that the larger campaign donations of the affluent must explain the misalignment in their
favor. 265 Gilens speculated in the same vein in his book, claiming that
“[m]oney—the ‘mother’s milk’ of politics—is the root of representa-

cy Preference and Priorities Across Income Groups in American Public Opinion 8, 13, 21,
24 (2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review Association)
(finding that even with respect to governmental spending by issue area, sizeable differences
in income group opinion appear if more specific policies are asked about).
260
For some of the voluminous literature on the higher participation of wealthier individuals, see Schlozman et al., supra note 150, at 15, 124; Benjamin I. Page et al., Democracy and
the Policy Preferences of Wealthy Americans, 11 Persp. Pol. 51, 54 (2013); Joe Soss & Lawrence R. Jacobs, The Place of Inequality: Non-Participation in the American Polity, 124 Pol.
Sci. Q. 95, 97 (2009).
261
See Bartels, supra note 221, at 275–81; Ellis, Understanding Biases, supra note 227, at
944–46.
262
See Bartels, supra note 221, at 275–81; Ellis, Understanding Biases, supra note 227, at
944–46.
263
See Bartels, supra note 221, at 275–81; Ellis, Understanding Biases, supra note 227, at
944–46.
264
See Bartels, supra note 221, at 277; see also Ellis, Understanding Biases, supra note
227, at 948 (“[O]nly a small part of this representation gap can be explained by patterns of
participation, knowledge, [or] education . . . .”); cf. Rhodes & Schaffner, supra note 228, at
31–32 (finding that result of unequal responsiveness holds even after limiting analysis to
voters).
265
See Bartels, supra note 221, at 280 (“[T]he data are consistent with the hypothesis that
senators represented their campaign contributors to the exclusion of other constituents.”).
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tional inequality.” 266 But neither Bartels nor Gilens, nor any of the other
scholars discussed in this Section, were able to provide any direct support for this hypothesis. I turn in the next Section, then, to scholars who
have mustered actual evidence of the misaligning effects of campaign
contributions. Their work is the strongest proof to date that the alignment interest is threatened by money in politics.
B. The Influence of Donors
If there is one thing that political scientists have learned about the
small slice of Americans who give money to candidates, it is that they
are nothing like their peers who do not give money. With respect to demographics, surveys carried out by Peter Francia et al., 267 Clyde Wilcox
et al., 268 and the Institute for Politics, Democracy, and the Internet 269 all
have found that individuals who contribute at least $200 to federal candidates are “overwhelmingly wealthy, highly educated, male, and
white.” 270 In 2004, for example, 58% of these donors were male, 69%
were older than fifty, 78% had a family income above $100,000, and
91% had a college degree. 271 In 2012, these donors amounted to just
0.4% of the population, but supplied 64% of the funds received by candidates from individuals. 272
Likewise, with respect to ideology, study after study has concluded
that donors hold more extreme views than the public at large. While the
ideal point distribution for the public is normal, with a single peak in the
moderate middle, 273 the distribution for donors is strikingly bimodal,

266

Gilens, supra note 233, at 10.
See Francia et al., supra note 5, at 15 (carrying out survey in 1996).
268
See Clyde Wilcox et al., With Limits Raised, Who Will Give More? The Impact of
BCRA on Individual Donors, in Life After Reform: When the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act Meets Politics 61 (Michael J. Malbin ed., 2003) (carrying out survey in 2000).
269
See Small Donors and Online Giving: A Study of Donors to the 2004 Presidential
Campaigns, Inst. for Pol., Democracy & the Internet 1 (2006), http://www.cfinst.org/
president/pdf/IPDI_SmallDonors.pdf [hereinafter IPDI Study] (carrying out survey in 2004).
270
Francia et al., supra note 5, at 16.
271
See IPDI Study, supra note 269, at 12; see also Francia et al., supra note 5, at 28; Wesley
Y. Joe et al., Do Small Donors Improve Representation? Some Answers from Recent Gubernatorial and State Legislative Elections, 19–20 tbl.1 (Aug. 28, 2008) (unpublished manuscript,
available at http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/books-reports/APSA_2008_SmallDonors.pdf) (reporting
similar results for donors to state legislative races); Wilcox et al., supra note 268, at 65.
272
See Donor Demographics, Ctr. for Responsive Pol., https://www.opensecrets.org/
bigpicture/DonorDemographics.php (last visited Feb. 2, 2015).
273
See Bafumi & Herron, supra note 6, at 536–37; Seth E. Masket & Hans Noel, Serving
Two Masters: Using Referenda to Assess Partisan Versus Dyadic Legislative Representation, 20 Pol. Res. Q. 104, 112 (2011); Shor, supra note 62, at 22.
267
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with one peak in the far left and another in the far right. This result is
robust to multiple analytic approaches. It holds for donors to congressional candidates, whom Joseph Bafumi and Michael Herron 274 and
Rhodes and Schaffner 275 both surveyed. It holds for donors to all candidates over the 1972–2012 span of the American National Election Survey, as reported by Michael Barber. 276 It holds for donors in all fifty
states, as also reported by Barber based on the Cooperative Congressional Election Study. 277 And it holds as well if donors’ views are determined not through survey responses but rather through the ideologies
of the candidates to whom they choose to contribute. Using this last approach, Barber, Adam Bonica, Nolan McCarty, and others have produced charts that reveal the bimodality of donor opinion in arresting detail. 278
The distinctiveness of donors would matter less if they gave money
for non-ideological reasons (such as personal connections or a desire for
access). In this case, the recipients of the contributions would not necessarily be ideologically extreme, and the contributions would not necessarily exert a misaligning influence. But surveys carried out by Barber, 279 Wesley Joe et al., 280 and Wilcox et al. 281 all found that the most
common reason given by donors for their contributions is candidates’
274
See Bafumi & Herron, supra note 6, at 537 (showing that donor ideal point distribution
is more bimodal than analogous voter distribution).
275
See Rhodes & Schaffner, supra note 228, at 34 (finding that variance of donor opinion
is 50% higher than that of voter opinion).
276
See Barber, supra note 35, at 14 (showing that donors are more extreme than nondonors in each survey year but one); see also id. at 14–16 (showing that donors remain more
ideological even after controls are added for non-monetary forms of participation).
277
See id. at 14–15 (showing that donors are more extreme than non-donors in each state).
278
See Nolan McCarty et al., Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal
Riches 162 (2006) (using soft money donations to national parties); Barber, supra note 35, at
23 (using donations to state legislative candidates); Michael Barber, Access Versus Ideology: Why PACs and Individuals Contribute to Campaigns 11 (Dec. 3, 2013) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) (using donations to state and
federal candidates); Bonica, supra note 3, at 26 (finding same bimodal distribution for donors generally and Fortune 500 executives specifically); Bonica et al., supra note 5, at 115
(same for small donors, donors in top 0.01% of income distribution, and Forbes 400 and Fortune 500 donors).
279
See Barber, supra note 278, at 10 (surveying donors to congressional candidates in
2012); Michael Barber et al., Presidents, Representation, and Campaign Donors 18–24 (Aug.
2014) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://static1.squarespace.com/static/51841c7
3e4b04fc5ce6e8f15/t/54d24dbce4b01b55b6de2b06/1423068604847/APSA2014_donors_dra
ft3.pdf) (surveying donors to presidential candidates in 2012).
280
See Joe et al., supra note 271, at 22 tbl.3 (surveying donors to state candidates in 2006).
281
Wilcox et al., supra note 268, at 68 (surveying donors to congressional candidates in
2000 and also reporting results of 1996 Francia et al. survey).

COPYRIGHT © 2015, VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

1476

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 101:1425

ideological proximity to them. As Barber put it, “ideological considerations are more likely to be rated as extremely important by donors than
access-related motivations or motivations related to personal connections to the candidate.” 282 In addition, studies by Barber, Michael
Ensley, Bertram Johnson, Raymond La Raja, Walter Stone, and others
all determined that the more extreme candidates are, the more money
they raise from individual donors. 283 Donors’ survey responses, then, are
more than mere words. Their replies are corroborated by their tendency
actually to contribute more heavily to candidates who share their immoderate views.
In combination, donors’ abundant resources, policy extremism, and
ideological giving contribute to severe misalignment in their favor.
Bafumi and Herron used the voting records of members of Congress and
the survey responses of donors to plot their ideal point distributions in a
common policy space. 284 Bonica used data on who gave and received all
disclosed campaign contributions to do the same. 285 Both studies found
that the distributions of donors and members of Congress are more or
less identical. 286 Their distributions are distinctly bimodal, again in
marked contrast to the normal distribution of the general public. 287 Similarly, Barber used roll call votes and survey responses to determine the
ideal points of senators, voters from each party, and all voters. 288 Senators, it turns out, are very distant ideologically from their state’s median
voter (who is represented only slightly better than a voter chosen at random). 289 They are substantially more aligned with the median voter from
282

Barber, supra note 278, at 8.
See Barber, supra note 35, at 23–28 (analyzing state legislative candidates); Raymond
J. La Raja & Brian F. Schaffner, Do Party-Centered Campaign Finance Laws Increase Funding for Moderates and Challengers? 19–20 (Jan. 2014) (unpublished manuscript, available at
https://polsci.umass.edu/uploads/profiles/sites/la-raja_ray/SPSA-LaRaja-Schaffner-Parties.pdf)
(same); see also Michael J. Ensley, Individual Campaign Contributions and Candidate Ideology, 138 Pub. Choice 221, 227 (2009) (analyzing U.S. House candidates); Bertram Johnson,
Individual Contributions: A Fundraising Advantage for the Ideologically Extreme?, 38 Am.
Pol. Res. 890, 899 (2010) (same); Walter J. Stone & Elizabeth N. Simas, Candidate Valence
and Ideological Positions in U.S. House Elections, 54 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 371, 381 (2010)
(same).
284
See Bafumi & Herron, supra note 6, at 522–26.
285
See Bonica, supra note 3, at 26–28; see also Adam Bonica, Mapping the Ideological
Marketplace, 58 Am. J. of Pol. Sci. 367, 368–70 (2014) (explaining methodology in more
detail).
286
See Bafumi & Herron, supra note 6, at 536–37; Bonica, supra note 3, at 29.
287
See Bafumi & Herron, supra note 6, at 536–37; Bonica, supra note 3, at 29; see also
supra note 273 and accompanying text (discussing ideal point distribution of public at large).
288
See Barber, supra note 6, at 10–19.
289
See id. at 19–20.
283
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their own party. 290 But “[a]mong both Republicans and Democrats, the
ideological congruence between senators and donors is nearly perfect.” 291 (Bonica’s and Barber’s results are displayed in Figure 3.)
Figure 3: Findings of Pro-Donor Misalignment by Bonica 292 and
Barber 293

290

See id. at 20–21.
Id. at 22 (emphasis added). Barber et al. also have found that the positions taken by the
President are much more responsive to same-party donors’ views than to same-party nondonors’ views. In fact, only the former are statistically significant in a model that includes
both sets of views as well as overall public opinion. See Barber et al., supra note 279, at 28–
29.
292
Bonica, supra note 3, at 32.
293
Barber, supra note 6, at 21.
291
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Barber’s analysis suggests that the proximity of donors’ and officeholders’ views is causal rather than correlational. Since senators represent their donors better than their constituents or their co-partisans, the
sway of campaign contributions must exceed the electoral incentive to
appeal to the median voter or the partisan urge to please fellow party
members. 294 Additional evidence along these lines comes from Ellis 295
and Rhodes and Schaffner, 296 both of whom found that donors’ preferences remain a significant driver of House members’ voting records
even after adding controls for voters’ preferences and various forms of
non-monetary participation. Still more such evidence comes from an experimental study recently conducted by Joshua Kalla and David
Broockman. 297 They sent e-mails to House members, half from “local
constituents” and half from “local campaign donors,” asking to meet to
discuss environmental issues. 298 Only 5.5% of the constituent e-mails resulted in a meeting with the House member or a senior staffer, compared
to 18.8% of the donor e-mails. 299 More work on causation is necessary,
but the existing literature does reveal a clear connection between campaign giving and misalignment.

294
Barber also suggests that legislators’ preferences might resemble those of donors because both groups are more affluent than the non-donating population. Legislators’ bimodal
preference distribution might be attributable to their own affluence, in other words. See id. at
28–32. This hypothesis warrants further investigation, but it cannot fully account for legislators’ bimodality since they are more ideologically extreme than affluent non-donors. Cf.
Barber, supra note 35, at 12–15 (finding that donors are more ideologically extreme than
equally politically active non-donors).
295
See Ellis, Understanding Biases, supra note 227, at 945–46 (finding that being large
donor increases alignment with House member even after controlling for voting, political
activity, political knowledge, and other factors).
296
See Rhodes & Schaffner, supra note 228, at 36–38 (finding that donor ideology remains
statistically significant predictor of House member ideology even after controlling for voter
ideology).
297
See Joshua L. Kalla & David E. Broockman, Congressional Officials Grant Access to
Individuals Because They Have Contributed to Campaigns: A Randomized Field Experiment
(Mar. 11, 2014) (unpublished manuscript, available at https://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/
~broockma/kalla_broockman_donor_access_field_experiment.pdf).
298
See id. at 7–12.
299
See id. at 16–17.
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Lastly, the misaligning influence of individual donors may be growing over time. As noted earlier, the level of preference misalignment has
surged over the last few decades (at least with respect to the U.S.
House). 300 Over the same period, the proportion of funds supplied to
House candidates by individual donors has increased from about 50% to
nearly 75%. 301 The share of individual donors who self-identify as ideologically extreme also has increased from around 40% to just over
60%. 302 These trends may be unrelated, but their juxtaposition still is
striking. If individual donors are becoming both more vital to candidates
and more radical in their views, then what we would expect for misalignment is exactly what we have witnessed: a steady, seemingly inexorable rise.
C. The Impact of Reform
That money in politics is misaligning, however, is only half the story.
For the alignment interest to be a valid justification for campaign finance regulations, these policies actually must be aligning. If their effects are ambiguous (or worse), then they lack the tight connection with
alignment that is necessary for them to be upheld on this basis. 303 I conclude this Part, then, by discussing a series of very recent studies on the
aligning implications of contribution limits on individuals, parties, and
PACs as well as different kinds of public financing. This literature only
now is emerging because the techniques for measuring voters’ and officeholders’ preferences previously did not exist. 304
But before getting to the studies’ findings, it is important to complete
the survey, begun above, of campaign funders’ ideological inclinations.
It should be clear by now that individual donors tend to be ideologically
extreme, with starkly bimodal ideal point distributions. But what about

300

See supra notes 249–50 and accompanying text.
See Barber & McCarty, supra note 35, at 31; see also Barber, supra note 35, at 21–23
(showing similar increase for state legislative candidates).
302
See La Raja & Wiltse, supra note 34, at 510. Perhaps relatedly, the share of campaign
contributions supplied by the richest 0.01% of Americans has skyrocketed from about 10%
in 1980 to about 40% in 2012. See Bonica et al., supra note 5, at 112.
303
See supra note 218 (discussing stringent scrutiny applied by courts when campaign finance regulations are challenged).
304
See Stephanopoulos, supra note 17, at 303 (noting recent development of these techniques).
301
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the other two key sources of money in politics, parties and PACs? 305
What do their policy preferences look like? Starting with parties, La Raja and Schaffner found that their views, at least as reflected in their
committees’ campaign contributions, are strikingly centrist. Parties donate about twice as much money to candidates in the middle of the political spectrum as they do to candidates at the edges. 306 The distribution of
party giving by candidate ideology (shown in Figure 4) is distinctly
normal, with a mode very near the ideological midpoint. 307 Of course,
the reason for this pattern is not that parties prefer moderate over liberal
or conservative policies. They plainly do not. Rather, the reason is that
“parties put a premium on winning elections,” and moderate candidates
are more likely to prevail at the polls than extreme ones. 308
Turning next to PACs, their ideologies (for the most part) are centrist
as well. Barber 309 and Bonica 310 both used the positions of the candidates
to whom PACs contribute to estimate the groups’ ideal points. The resulting distributions were normal and unimodal in every case: for PACs
that donated to state legislative candidates from 1996 to 2012, 311 for
PACs that donated to federal candidates in 2012 (shown in Figure 4), 312
and for PACs that donated to any candidate over the 1980–2010 period. 313 Consistent with these findings, Bonica and Andrew Hall both determined that moderate candidates raise more money from PACs than do
extreme ones. At the state legislative level, moderates raise about
305
In combination, individual donors, parties, and PACs account for essentially all of the
contributions that candidates receive. See Barber, supra note 35, at 22 (showing trends in
these funding sources over time for state legislative candidates); Barber & McCarty, supra
note 35, at 31–32 (same for congressional candidates).
306
See La Raja & Schaffner, supra note 283, at 8, 14 (analyzing party donations to state
senate candidates from 1996 to 2008).
307
See id.
308
Id. at 21; see, e.g., Brandice Canes-Wrone et al., Out of Step, Out of Office: Electoral
Accountability and House Members’ Voting, 96 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 127, 133, 135 (2002)
(finding that House incumbents with more extreme voting records are less likely to be
reelected); Anthony Gierzynski & David A. Breaux, The Financing Role of Parties, in Campaign Finance in State Legislative Elections 185, 195–200 (Joel A. Thompson & Gary F.
Moncrief eds., 1998) (finding that parties give most heavily to nonincumbent candidates in
competitive races).
309
See Barber, supra note 278, at 9–11; Barber, supra note 35, at 16–21.
310
See Adam Bonica, Ideology and Interests in the Political Marketplace, 57 Am. J. Pol.
Sci. 294, 295–98 (2013).
311
Barber, supra note 35, at 18–19.
312
See Barber, supra note 278, at 10–11 (finding clearly unimodal distribution for federal
contributors but slightly bimodal (though still centrist) distribution for state contributors).
313
See Bonica, supra note 310, at 301.
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$12,000 more than liberals and about $7,000 more than conservatives. 314
At the U.S. House level, the advantage for moderates is about $46,000
over liberals and about $69,000 over conservatives. 315 PACs’ ideologies,
like individuals’, thus are reflected in their contributions.
Figure 4: Findings on Party and PAC Ideal Points by La Raja &
Schaffner 316 and Barber 317

I noted above that PACs are centrist for the most part. The main exceptions to this rule are labor PACs, which are liberal in their orientation, 318 and single-issue PACs (focusing on abortion, taxes, the environment, and the like), which cluster at the ideological fringes. 319

314
Andrew B. Hall, How the Public Funding of Elections Increases Candidate Polarization
20 (Aug. 13, 2014) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) (considering state legislative candidates over 1992–2010 period).
315
See Bonica, supra note 310, at 306, 308 (considering U.S. House candidates in 2006
and 2008).
316
La Raja & Schaffner, supra note 283, at 8.
317
Barber, supra note 278, at 11.
318
See Bonica, supra note 310, at 301, 306–08; Bonica, supra note 285, at 375 (finding
that “ideological model” performs better than “investor model” in explaining labor PACs’
contributions); see also McCarty et al., supra note 278, at 148, 152 (finding that labor PACs
mostly contribute to liberal candidates).
319
See Bonica, supra note 310, at 301; La Raja & Schaffner, supra note 283, at 8, 14
(showing bimodal pattern for donations by issue groups); see also Michael Jay Barber, Buying Representation: The Incentives, Ideology, and Influence of Campaign Contributors in
American Politics 17–19 (Sep. 2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University,
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However, these entities’ donations are dwarfed by those of corporate
and trade PACs, to which the rule applies in full. 320 Another caveat is
that PACs’ centrist ideal points may be the product not of actual moderation but rather of tactical giving to politicians from both parties aimed
at securing access. There is some truth to this story; PACs give more
heavily to incumbents than to challengers, 321 and the variance of the ideologies of the candidates to whom PACs contribute is relatively high. 322
But Bonica 323 and McCarty et al. 324 both found that this variance is not
as high as it would be if PACs actually were insensitive to candidates’
views. PACs’ motives for giving thus seem to be a mix of acquiring access and supporting like-minded candidates.
This typology of campaign funders’ ideologies—in which individual
donors are extreme, and parties and PACs are moderate—explains why
certain campaign finance regulations are aligning and others are misaligning. In brief, regulations that decrease the relative importance of individual donors, or increase the relative importance of parties and PACs,
are aligning. Conversely, policies that make candidates more reliant on
individual donors, or less reliant on parties and PACs, are misaligning.
Policies’ aligning implications follow directly from their impact on the
composition of candidates’ funds.
Accordingly, as Barber found, contribution limits on individuals are
aligning. The lower a state’s individual limit is, the smaller the average
individual donation is, the more individuals hit the contribution ceiling,

on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) (finding that “ideological groups” including both labor PACs and single-issue PACs have bimodal ideal point distribution).
320
See Business-Labor-Ideology Split in PAC & Individual Donations to Candidates, Parties, Super PACs and Outside Spending Groups, Ctr. for Responsive Pol.,
http://www.opensecrets.org/ bigpicture/blio.php?cycle=2012 (last visited Feb. 23, 2015)
[hereinafter Business-Labor-Ideology Split] (showing that in 2012 cycle, business PACs
provided 72% of PAC contributions, compared to 13% for labor PACs and 15% for ideological PACs).
321
See Barber, supra note 278, at 13–14 (showing that, relative to individual donors, PACs
give greater share of contributions to incumbents at both state and federal levels); Barber,
supra note 35, at 16–20 (same at state level).
322
See Barber, supra note 278, at 12–14 (showing that variance is larger for PACs than for
individual donors at both state and federal levels).
323
See Bonica, supra note 310, at 302 (showing that variance for most PACs at state and
federal levels is below threshold that would indicate ideologically random giving).
324
See McCarty et al., supra note 278, at 148–50 (showing that variance for most PACs at
federal level is below threshold that would indicate ideologically random giving).
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and the less candidates raise from individuals. 325 As a result, a state that
switches from no individual limit at all to some sort of limit can expect
candidates’ ideologies to shift toward the center by 0.1 to 0.3 units (on a
-2 to 2 scale). 326 And a state that cuts its individual limit in half can expect candidates’ positions to become 0.02 to 0.03 units more moderate. 327 These effects may seem modest but they actually are quite substantial. As Barber wrote about the impact of adopting individual limits
in the first place, “This change is large and is two thirds of the standard
deviation of [party] ideal points . . . .” 328
Next, as La Raja and Schaffner determined, contribution limits on
parties are misaligning. Where such limits are present, state senate candidates receive a smaller proportion of their funds from parties, and a
larger proportion from individual donors. 329 For moderate candidates in
particular, party limits cause their share of party-supplied funds to drop
from above 8% to below 4%. 330 Consequently, party limits exert a centrifugal influence on candidates’ positions, and the absence of such limits exerts a centripetal influence. Specifically, the median Democrat’s
ideology is 1.56 units apart from the median Republican’s in state legislatures subject to party limits, but only 1.15 units apart in legislatures
free from such limits. 331 Party limits thus are associated with roughly a
35% increase in polarization. 332
Analogously, as Barber also found, contribution limits on PACs are
misaligning too. The tighter a state’s PAC limit is, the smaller the average PAC donation is, the more PACs bump up against the contribution

325

See Barber, supra note 35, at 32–33 (presenting charts displaying each of these relationships).
326
See id. at 36–38. The larger of these figures is for Republican candidates.
327
See id. The larger of these figures again is for Republicans.
328
Id. at 36 (referring to Republican candidates and also finding that impact is smaller for
Democrats). Moreover, these effects are quite a bit larger in states with more professional
legislatures. See id. at 37; see also Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos et al., The Realities of Electoral Reform, 67 Vand. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 40–42, on file with author) (also finding that individual contribution limits improve district-level alignment).
329
See La Raja & Schaffner, supra note 283, at 16 (showing bar charts to this effect); id. at
19 (confirming result with multiple regression model).
330
See id. at 17.
331
See Ray La Raja & Brian Schaffner, Want to Reduce Polarization? Give Parties More
Money, Wash. Post (July 21, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/
wp/2014/07/21/want-to-reduce-polarization-give-parties-more-money.
332
See id.
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ceiling, and the less candidates collect from PACs. 333 As a result, a state
that switches from no PAC limit at all to some kind of limit can expect
candidates’ ideologies to move away from the midpoint by 0.1 to 0.2
units. 334 And a state that cuts its PAC limit in half can expect candidates’
positions to become 0.005 to 0.02 units more extreme. 335 These effects
are sizeable as well: “[M]oving to unlimited PAC contributions
shifts . . . legislators’ predicted ideal point . . . [by] 43 percent of the
standard deviation of [party] ideal points.” 336
This leaves us with public financing, two types of which have been
analyzed for their aligning impact. First, Hall 337 and Seth Masket and
Michael Miller 338 examined the “clean money” systems used in Arizona,
Connecticut, and Maine. Under these systems, candidates who obtain a
certain number of small contributions from individual donors then receive block grants that fund the rest of their campaigns. 339 Publicly
funded candidates also must abide by spending limits and accept no further donations. 340 Despite their popularity with reformers, these schemes
are misaligning because they eliminate most party and PAC contributions and make the grants contingent on candidates’ appeal to individual
donors. According to Hall, the gap between a Democrat and a Republican representing the same district (and the same median voter) jumps
from 1.16 units to 1.51 units under clean money. 341 According to Masket
and Miller, candidates entering the legislature after being elected with
clean money often (but not always) are more polarized than their privately financed peers. 342
333

See Barber, supra note 35, at 32–34 (presenting charts displaying each of these relationships).
334
See id. at 37–39.
335
See id.
336
Id. at 38. These effects are larger for Democrats in states with more professional legislatures and for Republicans in states with less professional legislatures. See id. at 37.
337
See Hall, supra note 314, at 4–5 (focusing on clean money systems but also considering
older (and less generous) public financing systems used in Minnesota and Wisconsin).
338
See Seth E. Masket & Michael G. Miller, Buying Extremists? Public Funding, Parties,
and Polarization in Maine and Arizona 4–6 (2012) (considering Arizona and Maine).
339
See id. at 4–5; Hall, supra note 314, at 4–5.
340
See Masket & Miller, supra note 338, at 5.
341
See Hall, supra note 314, at 19.
342
See Masket & Miller, supra note 338, at 15–19, 30. In particular, this effect holds for
Democrats and Republicans in Arizona (where the polarizing effects are larger too), and for
Republicans in Maine. See also Jeffrey J. Harden & Justin H. Kirkland, Do Campaign Donors Influence Polarization? Evidence from Public Financing in the American States, Legis.
Stud. Q. (forthcoming 2016), available at https://jhkirkla.wordpress.com/2015/01/27/do-
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Second, Elizabeth Genn et al. 343 and Michael Malbin et al. 344 uncovered tantalizing clues that New York City’s multiple-match system may
be aligning (though they did not measure alignment directly). Under
New York City’s system, contributions up to $175 from individual donors to city council candidates are matched six-to-one by the government. 345 Publicly funded candidates again must comply with spending
limits, but they are not barred from receiving contributions from parties
and PACs. 346 That these more centrist entities are not excluded from participation is one reason why multiple-match may perform differently
than clean money.
The more important reason is that multiple-match transforms the pool
of individual donors. Genn et al. compared donors to city council candidates to donors to New York City’s state house candidates (to whom
multiple-match does not apply). 347 They determined that the former are
poorer (with almost the same poverty rate as the city as a whole), more
racially diverse (with almost the same non-white proportion), and less
educated (with almost the same share not completing high school). 348
Multiple-match thus attracts a much more representative group of donors than conventional private financing. Similarly, Malbin et al. found
that city council candidates raise 63% of their funds from donors who
campaign-donors-influence-polarization-evidence-from-public-financing-in-the-americanstates-with-jeffrey-j-harden) (also finding increase in polarization following enactment of
reform in Arizona and Maine, but concluding that increase is not statistically significant);
Seth E. Masket & Michael G. Miller, Does Public Election Funding Create More Extreme
Legislators? Evidence from Arizona and Maine, 15 St. Pol. & Pol’y Q. 1, 9–12 (2014) (rerunning earlier analysis and finding statistically significant polarizing effect only for Arizona
Republicans); Stephanopoulos et al., supra note 328 (manuscript at 40–42) (also finding that
public financing is misaligning at district level).
343
See Elisabeth Genn et al., Donor Diversity Through Public Matching Funds 7 (2012)
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/
legacy/publications/DonorDiversityReport_WEB.PDF).
344
See Michael J. Malbin et al., Small Donors, Big Democracy: New York City’s Matching Funds as a Model for the Nation and States, 11 Election L.J. 3, 4 (2012).
345
See id. at 5–6.
346
See id. at 5, 7.
347
See Genn et al., supra note 343, at 8. More specifically, they compared the census block
groups (“CBGs”) where donors live, because information about the donors themselves was
unavailable.
348
See id. at 14. In particular, 21% of New Yorkers are below the poverty line, compared
to 19% of city council and 16% of state house small-donor CBGs; 55% of New Yorkers are
non-white, compared to 54% of city council and 39% of state house small-donor CBGs; and
28% of New Yorkers have not finished high school, compared to 26% of city council and
22% of state house small-donor CBGs. See id.
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give less than $250. 349 In contrast, U.S. Senate candidates raise only
14% of their funds from such donors, U.S. House candidates raise only
8%, and New York state legislative candidates just 7%. 350 This result also suggests that donors to city council candidates, unlike most other individual donors in American politics, may be a centripetal rather than a
centrifugal force.
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF ALIGNMENT
A key lesson from this empirical evidence is that alignment is affected in different ways by different policies. Unlike interests such as anticorruption, anti-distortion, and equality, which tend to be asserted in defense of every kind of campaign finance regulation, 351 alignment is an
available justification only in limited circumstances. In this Part, I explore what exactly these circumstances are. I explore, that is, what the
doctrinal implications of the alignment approach are for the main types
of campaign finance regulation: contribution limits, expenditure limits,
and public financing. 352 In this discussion, I draw heavily on the political
science studies detailed above. But I also rely on informed speculation
where actual empirics are unavailable.
Three more points before beginning this analysis: First, that a given
policy is misaligning, or neutral in its impact, does not mean that it is
necessarily unconstitutional. It only means that the alignment interest
cannot be used to justify the policy. Quite possibly, other interests still
can be invoked in the policy’s defense. I focus here on the doctrinal consequences that would follow from judicial recognition of the alignment
interest. But I do not mean to slight other interests whose consequences
349

city).

See Malbin et al., supra note 344, at 14–15 (including matching funds received from

350
See id at 14. Just below New York City on the list is Minnesota, where state legislative
candidates raise sixty percent of their funds from small donors. Minnesota has the most generous of the first-generation public financing systems, offering donors a rebate of up to fifty
dollars for their campaign contributions, as well as block grants to participating candidates.
See id.
351
In particular, the anti-corruption interest has been invoked in essentially every Supreme
Court case since Buckley. See supra Section I.B.
352
I do not discuss disclosure requirements because there is no available evidence on their
aligning effects. They also rest on sturdier legal ground than other regulations thanks to their
connection to the government’s distinct informational interest. See Citizens United v. FEC,
130 S. Ct. 876, 914–16 (2010) (discussing this interest). I also do not discuss measures outside the campaign finance context that might both improve alignment and burden First
Amendment rights. There is only so much ground a given paper can cover.
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may be quite different. Second, the constitutionality of a given policy
hinges on both its connection to alignment and the magnitude of the
burden it imposes on First Amendment rights. I only consider the link to
alignment here. But it is worth noting that a heavy rights burden triggers
more stringent judicial scrutiny, 353 which in turn may lead to the voiding
of a policy that is aligning (just not aligning enough).
And third, this Part’s doctrinal conclusions are provisional in several
respects. Most obviously, they hinge on very recent empirical studies
whose findings may turn out to be incorrect. If individual donors are not
ideologically extreme, or if parties and PACs are not relatively moderate, then very different results would follow. Even if the studies are accurate at present, actors’ views may shift over time. One can imagine a
future world, not too unlike our own, in which aroused centrists are the
largest individual donors, and parties and PACs choose to prioritize ideology over electability. 354 Lastly, laws that differentiate by entity may be
vulnerable to manipulation. For instance, if individuals were subject to
tighter limits than parties or PACs, they could channel more of their
funds through the latter groups. The laxer restrictions on the groups then
would have to be revisited to take into account their increased extremism. 355
A. Contribution Limits
Contribution limits are perhaps the most familiar kind of campaign finance regulation. They restrict contributions to candidates by individu-

353
See supra note 218 and accompanying text (noting that standard of review is stricter for
expenditure limits, which Court views as particularly burdensome, than for contribution limits). Assuming that alignment is a compelling interest, the main reason why the standard of
review matters is that strict scrutiny typically requires a regulation to be the least restrictive
means for achieving the interest. A plaintiff thus could try to show that there exist less burdensome but equally aligning measures that could be enacted. However, this showing would
not be easy. The evidence on the aligning effects of most electoral regulations is either
mixed or nonexistent, and many of these regulations burden constitutional rights as well.
354
Though it is worth noting that the relative ideological positions of individuals, parties,
and PACs have not varied greatly in the past, see Barber, supra note 35, at 14–16, and that
there are good theoretical reasons to expect each entity to continue to hold the views that it
does today.
355
Though it is unclear that parties or PACs would change their giving patterns if they received more money from ideologically extreme individuals. The groups’ incentives to contribute to more moderate candidates would remain in place.
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als, parties, PACs, corporations, unions, and other entities. 356 At the federal level, individuals can donate up to $5,200 per candidate per cycle. 357
The equivalent figure is $10,000 both for parties and for PACs, while
direct corporate and union contributions are banned. 358 The aggregate
limit of $123,200 on individual donations per cycle recently was struck
down in McCutcheon. 359 At the state level, contribution limits vary dramatically from one jurisdiction (and funding source) to another. 360 Individual limits, for instance, range from $320 in Montana to no cap at all
in a dozen states. 361 Similarly, corporate and union limits run the gamut
from outright prohibition to no restriction whatsoever. 362
Beginning with individual contribution limits, they generally would
be valid under the alignment approach for the simple reason that they
generally are aligning. The empirical evidence shows that individual donors hold ideologically extreme views and that politicians mirror these
views almost perfectly. 363 Barber also found that restrictions on individual contributions cause politicians’ positions to move toward the center
(though further confirmation of this finding would be helpful). 364 To be
sure, one can conceive of scenarios in which individual limits would not
be aligning—if individual donors in a given jurisdiction were ideologically moderate, if they gave for reasons other than candidates’ ideological proximity to them, or if candidates were not motivated to maximize
their campaign resources. But there is no indication that these scenarios
are common in modern American politics. The connection between individual limits and alignment thus is strong.
Next, contribution limits on parties typically could not be sustained
under the alignment approach. La Raja and Schaffner determined that
356
They also restrict contributions to some of the entities that themselves are restricted in
how much they may give to candidates.
357
See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)–(2) (2012); Contribution Limits 2013–14, Fed. Election
Comm’n, http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/contriblimits.shtml (last visited June 26,
2015).
358
See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3); Contribution Limits 2013–14, supra note 357.
359
See Contribution Limits 2013–14, supra note 357; see also McCutcheon v. FEC, 134
S. Ct. 1434, 1442–43 (2014) (plurality opinion).
360
See Contribution Limits: An Overview, Nat’l Conf. of State Legis. (Oct. 3, 2011),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/campaign-contribution-limitsoverview.
361
See id.
362
See id.
363
See supra Section III.B.
364
See Barber, supra note 35, at 37–39.
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parties give more heavily to moderate candidates than to extreme
ones. 365 They also found that restrictions on party contributions are
linked to about a 35% increase in legislative polarization (though further
confirmation again would be useful). 366 True, the motivation for the parties’ giving may be strategic rather than ideological. The parties may
want to win more elections by supporting more moderate candidates, not
to see more moderate policy actually enacted. 367 But the parties’ intent is
irrelevant for present purposes. It is the effect that counts here, and the
impact of party limits is plainly misaligning.
The story is somewhat more complicated for contribution limits on
PACs. According to Bonica, corporate and trade PACs usually have
moderate ideal points. 368 According to Barber, restrictions on PAC contributions (most of which are made by corporate and trade groups) cause
politicians’ positions to shift away from the center. 369 So far, so good;
contribution limits on corporate and trade PACs, like such limits on parties, are not aligning and so could not be upheld under the alignment approach. But there are other types of PACs too, and their ideal points are
not moderate. In particular, Bonica determined that labor PACs are quite
liberal, and that single-issue PACs are highly bimodal in their stances.370
Contribution limits on these PACs might well be aligning, as they could
reduce politicians’ incentive to veer left in the case of labor PACs, or
toward either extreme in the case of single-issue PACs. 371 The doctrinal
fate of PAC limits thus might vary by PAC category.
This conclusion may be unsettling to some readers. Are PACs not a
threat to the integrity of the electoral system, rather than a largely benign presence? And of the various types of PACs, are corporate and
trade PACs not the most dangerous—the very epitome of big money?
365

See La Raja & Schaffner, supra note 283, at 8, 14.
See La Raja & Schaffner, supra note 331.
See supra note 308 and accompanying text.
368
See Bonica, supra note 310, at 301; Bonica, supra note 285, at 375.
369
See Barber, supra note 309, at 37–39.
370
See Bonica, supra note 310, at 301, 306, 308; Bonica, supra note 285, at 375; see also
McCarty et al., supra note 278, at 148 (finding that labor PACs have more liberal contribution patterns than other PACs); La Raja & Schaffner, supra note 283, at 8, 14 (finding that
issue groups donate to more ideologically extreme candidates).
371
Alas, this prediction has not yet been tested by political scientists. Another hypothesis
that has yet to be investigated is that contribution limits on corporations and unions have the
same aligning implications, respectively, as limits on corporate and union PACs. This hypothesis seems reasonable because corporate PACs raise almost all of their money from corporate employees, and union PACs obtain almost all of their funds from union members.
366
367
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There are several responses to this unease. First, some corporate and
trade PACs do have extreme ideal points and donate more money to extreme candidates. 372 PACs in the construction and energy sectors, for instance, are skewed distinctly to the right. 373 If their contributions were
limited, the effect likely would be aligning. Second, corporate and trade
PACs may undermine the electoral system through mechanisms other
than misalignment. Their donations may buy them special access to
lawmakers and special influence over the shaping of public policy.
These are troublesome results even if they do not produce measurable
non-congruence. And third, it is possible that the democratic threat
posed by business influence has been overstated. Corporate and trade
PACs are nobody’s idea of altruistic groups sacrificing for the public
good. But their relative moderation in a time of surging polarization may
be valuable.
Another potentially worrisome implication of this analysis is that the
validity of contribution limits may vary based on the identity of the entity being limited. Restrictions on individual contributions may be lawful,
for example, while restrictions on party or PAC contributions may not
be. Does this not amount to illegal viewpoint discrimination? Again,
there are several replies to this objection. First, the essence of viewpoint
discrimination is action taken by a jurisdiction because it “fears, dislikes,
or disagrees with” the “substantive content” of a given message. 374 But
if a jurisdiction limits certain entities’ donations in order to promote
alignment, then the rationale for the limitation is the promotion of
alignment—not any fear, dislike, or disagreement with the entities’
views. It also is not the entities’ views that concern a jurisdiction seeking
to improve alignment, but rather the views’ divergence from the position
of the median voter. Location along an ideological spectrum is distinct

372

See Bonica, supra note 310, at 306 (showing that PACs in certain sectors give more
money to extreme Democrats and/or Republicans relative to baseline candidate). In addition,
PACs’ overall moderation may mask particular positions (quite possibly on the issues that
matter most to the PACs) that are very different from those of the general public.
373
See id.
374
Wood v. Moss, 134 S. Ct. 2056, 2066 (2014). Or as now-Justice Elena Kagan has put
it, “[w]henever hostility toward ideas as such . . . has played some part in effecting a restriction on speech, the restriction is irretrievably tainted.” Elena Kagan, Private Speech,
Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 413, 431 (1996) (emphasis added). “In contrast . . . when the government has restricted ideas only as and when they bear harmful consequences[,] the government’s purposes support sustaining the action.” Id. (emphasis added).
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from the substantive content that the government is prohibited from taking into account.
Second, it is unlikely that courts would consider contribution limits to
be vulnerable to a viewpoint discrimination challenge in the first place.
Any particular restriction treats identically all donors whom it covers. A
contribution limit on individuals, for instance, in no way distinguishes
between moderate and extreme persons. At the aggregate level too, considering the full set of limits in effect in a given jurisdiction, the policies
may differentiate by entity, but they do not do so by viewpoint. And under the Court’s precedent, speaker-based regulations are subject only to
review for reasonableness, in contrast to the strict scrutiny that applies to
viewpoint-based regulations. 375
Lastly, while the contribution limits that best promote alignment may
vary by entity, existing limits do so too. At the federal level, as noted
earlier, the donation ceiling is $5,200 for individuals, $10,000 for parties
and PACs, and $0 for corporations and unions. 376 Most states also specify different limits for different entities. 377 The reasons for this divergent
treatment have not been disclosed, but they presumably include judgments about the relative threat posed by different funding sources. Accordingly, if the optimal pro-alignment policy set may be challenged on
viewpoint discrimination grounds, then so too may be the status quo.
Both the alignment approach and the status quo distinguish among entities based on their capacity to undermine key democratic values. But if
the status quo is secure from such attack—as suggested by the lack of
any campaign finance regulation struck down for discriminating by
viewpoint—then the alignment approach should be safe as well. 378

375

See Leslie Kendrick, Content Discrimination Revisited, 98 Va. L. Rev. 231, 267 (2012)
(observing that “speaker- and medium-based discrimination appears not to be suspect in itself”); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Wm. & Mary L.
Rev. 189, 247 (1983) (noting that “the Court sharply distinguishe[s] speaker-based from
viewpoint-based restrictions and . . . test[s] speaker-based restrictions by a standard of reasonableness”).
376
See supra notes 357–58 and accompanying text.
377
See supra notes 360–62 and accompanying text.
378
A related First Amendment concern may be that the alignment approach seems, at first
glance, to permit the silencing of dissenters seeking to persuade the public of their unorthodox views. In fact, the approach does no such thing. Either dissenting speech fails to persuade, in which case it is irrelevant, or it does persuade, in which case people’s preferences
shift and there is a new benchmark with which governmental outputs should align. Speech
never can be regulated under this approach because of its impact on the public.
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B. Expenditure Limits
Limits on electoral expenditures are a second kind of campaign finance regulation, albeit one more important in theory than in practice.
Congress’s 1974 amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act included spending limits on individuals, groups, candidates, and parties. 379
But all of these limits were struck down in Buckley on the grounds that
they burdened First Amendment rights more heavily than contribution
limits, while not preventing corruption as effectively. 380 Spending bans
on corporations and unions survived Buckley and also were upheld in
Austin. 381 But they too fell by the wayside in Citizens United. 382 At present, no form of expenditure limit, at either the state or federal level, is
permitted. 383
Because few spending limits have been in place since Buckley, there
is little direct evidence on their aligning implications. Political scientists
cannot easily assess policies that have not been enacted. But it still is
possible to make some educated guesses as to how different types of
spending limits would fare under the alignment approach, using the data
that is available. One reasonable hypothesis is that campaign funders
exhibit the same ideological inclinations whether they use their funds on
contributions or expenditures. In other words, individuals, unions, and
single-issue groups are ideologically extreme (and prefer extreme candidates) whether they are donating money or spending it themselves.
Likewise, parties and businesses are relatively moderate (and prefer
moderate candidates) no matter how they are deploying their resources.
Some support for this hypothesis comes from the identities of the individuals who gave money to Super PACs in the 2012 election. (Super
PACs, again, may fundraise and spend in unlimited quantities because
they do not contribute directly to candidates. 384) According to the Center
379

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39 (1976).
See id. at 39, 44–59.
381
See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660–61 (1990).
382
See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 901–908, 911–913 (2010).
383
Prior to Citizens United, bans on corporate and union expenditures existed in about half of
the states. See Life After Citizens United, Nat’l Conference of State Legis. (Jan. 4, 2011),
http://ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/citizens-united-and-the-states.aspx; see also Am.
Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012) (per curiam) (summarily reversing Montana Supreme Court decision upholding corporate expenditure ban, and thus confirming that “the holding of Citizens United applies to . . . state law”).
384
See supra notes 4, 109 and accompanying text. Super PACs have become the vehicle of
choice for funders who would like to make independent expenditures. Relatively few funders
380
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for Responsive Politics, more than 80% of the individuals who donated
to Restore Our Future, the Super PAC supporting Mitt Romney’s candidacy, also gave the maximum possible amount to Romney’s own campaign. 385 The proportions were similar for other presidential candidates. 386 Donors to Super PACs and donors to actual campaigns thus
were the very same people. Analogously, McCarty et al. found that in
the 2002 election—the last before the use of soft money to pay for parties’ unlimited issue advertising was banned—almost all large soft money donors held extreme views. 387 The same pattern held in 2004 when
funds flowed to other groups that also could engage in unlimited issue
advertising. “The major contributors to . . . [these groups were] exactly
the same people who made large soft money contributions.” 388
Data from the 2012 election further suggests that corporations are relatively moderate and unions are liberal in their spending choices. Free
for the first time to tap their treasuries in federal elections, corporations
allocated just $75 million to independent expenditures. 389 This sum
amounted to about 1% of total federal outlays, 390 and contrasts sharply
with the $365 million that corporate PACs gave to candidates. 391 Such
limited spending is what one would expect if corporations are mostly
centrist entities seeking to ruffle few feathers and maintain their access
to officeholders. Unions, on the other hand, took full advantage of their
choose to make such expenditures themselves. Of course, as with conventional PACs, it is
possible that Super PACs’ spending priorities may diverge from those of their funders.
385
See Double-Duty Donors, Part II: Large Numbers of Wealthy Donors Hit Legal Limit on
Giving to Candidates, Turn to Presidential Super PACs in Continuing Trend, Ctr. for Responsive Pol. (Feb. 21, 2012), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2012/02/double-duty-donors-partii-large-nu.html. Unfortunately, this study only covered donations to candidate-linked Super
PACs in 2011. More research is needed on donors to the entire array of Super PACs over the
whole election cycle.
386
See id.
387
See McCarty et al., supra note 278, at 155–58, 162.
388
See id. at 158. These groups were organized under § 527 of the Internal Revenue Code
and included America Comes Together, a sort of shadow campaign for Democratic nominee
John Kerry.
389
See Bonica, supra note 3, at 10. Technically, corporations and unions also were able to
make independent expenditures in part of the 2010 cycle, since Citizens United was decided
in January 2010. See also Diana Dwyre, After Citizens United and SpeechNow.org: Considering the Consequences of New Campaign Finance Rules 13 (Sept. 3, 2011) (unpublished
manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1901547) (finding that corporations gave
just $0.05 million to Super PACs in 2010, and unions $10.9 million).
390
See FEC 2012 Summary, supra note 2 (noting total federal spending of $7.3 billion in
2012).
391
See Business-Labor-Ideology Split, supra note 320.
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newfound flexibility in 2012. They devoted $105 million to independent
expenditures, 392 compared to $66 million in labor PAC contributions to
candidates. 393 Such aggressive exploitation of new funding opportunities
is what one would expect from highly ideological actors. 394
That campaign funders have the same policy preferences no matter
how they use their money, however, does not prove that expenditures
are linked to alignment itself. For this conclusion to follow, expenditures
also must exert an influence on candidates. On this point, a reasonable
hypothesis is that expenditures indeed affect candidates—but not quite
to the same extent as contributions. Candidates tend to hold the same
positions as their donors, either because they shift their views in the donors’ direction to attract funding, or because only candidates who share
the donors’ views in the first place are financially viable. 395 These
mechanisms also seem likely to produce convergence between candidates and those who spend on their behalf, only not to the same degree
because a donated dollar is more valuable to a candidate than an independently spent dollar. The candidate has full control over the donated
dollar, while the spent dollar may not be used precisely as the candidate
would have liked.
Unfortunately, I am unaware of any empirical evidence on the impact
of expenditures on candidates. The Court, though, seems convinced that
candidates are not indifferent to money that is spent on their behalf. In
McCutcheon, the Court gave an example of a candidate faced with a
choice between $26,000 in contributions and $500,000 in supportive expenditures. 396 The Court was confident the candidate would prefer the
latter. 397 The candidate’s lack of control over the spending may “‘undermine[] the value of the expenditure’”—“[b]ut probably not by 95
percent.” 398 Many scholars concur with the Court. Briffault, for instance,
392

See Bonica, supra note 3, at 12.
See Business-Labor-Ideology Split, supra note 320.
394
Of course, this data is merely suggestive of corporations’ and unions’ ideological inclinations. Corporations could be extreme despite devoting only a small share of their funds to
independent spending, and unions could be moderate despite devoting a large share. This is
an area where further research plainly would be valuable.
395
See supra Section III.B.
396
See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1454 (2014) (plurality opinion).
397
See id.
398
Id. (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010)); see also FEC v. Natl’l
Conservative Pol. Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 498 (1985) (noting that “absence of prearrangement and coordination” of expenditure “undermines” but does not eliminate “the value
of the expenditure to the candidate”).
393
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has argued that the “prospect of . . . extremely large—and legally unlimited—donations to an allied Super PAC . . . is at least as likely to affect
the . . . decisions of elected officials as the relatively paltry amounts that
candidates’ personal campaign committees are allowed to receive.”399
Likewise, Cain has commented that a candidate will not “feel any less
obligated to a large independent spender than to a large contributor.” 400
If spenders and donors are equally ideological, and if spending and
donating have similar effects on candidates, then spending and donating
limits would have the same legal status under the alignment approach.
They would rise or fall together for each category of campaign funder. 401
Accordingly, spending limits on individuals, unions, and single-issue
groups (all ideologically extreme funding sources) generally would be
valid because they generally would be aligning. 402 On the other hand,
spending limits on parties and businesses (both relatively moderate
sources) typically could not be sustained by reference to alignment. 403
The doctrinal distinction between contributions and expenditures, a cornerstone of campaign finance law since Buckley, thus would crumble
under the alignment approach. Money would be treated the same whether it is donated or spent.

399

Richard Briffault, Super PACs, 96 Minn. L. Rev. 1644, 1692 (2012).
Cain, supra note 175, at 43; see also, e.g., Cole, supra note 193, at 272 (arguing that
“expenditures are just as corrupting as contributions”); Richard L. Hasen, Three Wrong Progressive Approaches (and One Right One) to Campaign Finance Reform, 8 Harv. L. & Pol’y
Rev. 21, 33 (2014) (observing that “$20 million in a Super PAC supporting Member of Congress X is less bad (but still bad) than $20 million in Member X’s campaign account”); Michael S. Kang, The Year of the Super PAC, 81 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1902, 1914 (2013) (noting that Super PACs “embody a dramatic increase in the . . . influence of the very wealthy in
national politics”).
401
As for spending limits on candidates, they could not be upheld on the basis of alignment. Candidates’ own spending cannot induce them to move in any particular ideological
direction. Furthermore, the earlier discussion of viewpoint discrimination challenges, see
supra notes 374–77 and accompanying text, applies here as well. Spending limits that distinguish between different entities might be subject to such attacks, but for the reasons stated
earlier, I do not believe that the attacks would succeed.
402
This conclusion also likely would hold for PACs, Super PACs, or other groups funded
by these actors. And unlike under Lessig’s model, there would be no reason to distinguish
between individual expenditures (whose restriction Lessig would bar) and individual contributions to Super PACs (which Lessig would allow to be curtailed). See Lessig, supra note
170, at 20–21. If funds from individual donors are misaligning, they could be regulated under the alignment approach no matter what form they take.
403
Again, this conclusion likely would hold for PACs, Super PACs, or other groups funded by these entities.
400
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C. Public Financing
Public financing is the final major category of campaign finance regulation, and it can be divided in turn into three types of policies. First,
several states provide block grants to participating candidates who receive a sufficient number of small individual donations. 404 In some cases, these grants are relatively stingy, and candidates may continue fundraising until they hit the spending limits that accompany the public
funds. 405 But in Arizona, Connecticut, and Maine (the clean money
states), the grants are meant to pay for campaigns in full, and candidates
may collect no further contributions after accepting them. 406
Second, numerous jurisdictions at the federal, state, and local levels
encourage individual donations through matching programs and tax benefits. The federal government matches contributions up to $250 to qualifying candidates in presidential primary elections. 407 About half a dozen
states offer tax credits or deductions for donations, typically up to $50 or
$100. 408 And cities such as Los Angeles and Oakland have one-to-one
matches similar to the federal government’s, 409 while New York City
employs a six-to-one match for contributions up to $175. 410 Third, another ten or so states provide block grants to political parties. 411 These
(quite modest) grants usually are paid for by income tax check-offs
ranging from $1 to $5 that enable taxpayers to steer funds to the party of
their choice. 412
Of these policies, the doctrinal fate of block grants triggered by individual donations is clearest. These measures generally could not be up404
See Michael G. Miller, After the GAO Report: What Do We Know About Public Election
Funding?, 10 Election L.J. 273, 274–75 (2011); Public Financing of Campaigns: An Overview,
Nat’l Conference of State Legis. (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-andcampaigns/public-financing-of-campaigns-overview.aspx [hereinafter Public Financing Overview].
405
See Public Financing Overview, supra note 404.
406
See id. A few more states employ clean money systems for statewide (as opposed to
legislative) elections. See id.
407
See Public Funding of Presidential Election, Fed. Election Comm’n (Apr. 2014),
http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/pubfund.shtml.
408
See Public Financing Overview, supra note 404.
409
See Steven M. Levin, Keeping It Clean: Public Financing in American Elections 116–
17 (2006); see also Public Financing Overview, supra note 404 (showing that several states
also offer matching funds to candidates for statewide office).
410
See supra note 345 and accompanying text.
411
See Public Financing Overview, supra note 404.
412
See id.
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held under the alignment approach because they generally are misaligning. Hall found that candidates’ positions diverge from the ideological
center after clean money systems (or their less generous predecessors)
are adopted. 413 Likewise, Masket and Miller determined that candidates
elected with clean money often are more polarized than their peers who
rely on private financing. 414 Both studies attributed their findings to candidates’ need to appeal to ideologically extreme individual donors in order to qualify for public funds.
To be sure, there may be compelling rationales for these regulations
other than alignment. For example, the very terminology of “clean”
money suggests that it is less corrupting than the usual “dirty” cash. 415
Political scientists also have observed striking increases in competitiveness in the clean money states. 416 Moreover, it may be possible to revise
the regulations in ways that make them more aligning. For instance, if
block grants were offered automatically to candidates (as they are in
presidential general elections 417), then candidates would not have to woo
polarized individual donors. Alternatively, if candidates had to collect
contributions from voters from both parties (and from independents too)
before qualifying for grants, then their donor bases would be less
skewed toward the ideological fringes. Reformers who value alignment
should consider such tweaks.
Next, most of the programs aimed at spurring individual donations also could not be sustained under the alignment approach. The problem
here, though, is not that these programs are misaligning, but rather that
they seem to have little impact on the composition of the donor pool.
According to a series of surveys, donors in presidential elections (in
which contribution matching is available) are just as unrepresentative of
the general population as donors in congressional elections (in which it

413

See Hall, supra note 314, at 19.
See Masket & Miller, supra note 338, at 15–17. And if Harden and Kirkland are correct
that clean money systems have no impact on polarization, then they still are not aligning and
so cannot be sustained under the alignment approach. See Harden & Kirkland, supra note
342 (manuscript at 23–24).
415
Cf. Fair Facts, Pub. Campaign, http://www.publicampaign.org/fair-facts (last visited
Aug. 1, 2014) (claiming that clean money will end solicitation of “well heeled donors and
lobbyists” as well as government “bought and paid for by special interests”).
416
See, e.g., Hall, supra note 314 (manuscript at 12–15); Neil Malhotra, The Impact of
Public Financing on Electoral Competition: Evidence from Arizona and Maine, 8 St. Pol. &
Pol’y Q. 263, 273–77 (2008); Miller, supra note 404, at 283–84.
417
See Public Funding of Presidential Election, supra note 407.
414
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is not). 418 Similarly, at the state level, candidates raise a median of 15%
of their funds from small donors in states offering tax credits or deductions. 419 The equivalent figure in states that do not offer such incentives
is a nearly identical 17%. 420 Since these programs do not meaningfully
alter the donor pool, it is hard to see how they could affect the level of
alignment.
The main exception to this pessimistic conclusion is New York City’s
multiple-match system. Malbin et al. determined that city council candidates collect 63% of their funds from small donors, the highest such figure in the nation. 421 Likewise, Genn et al. concluded that donors to city
council candidates are very similar to the city’s general population in
terms of race, income, and education. 422 If these donors also are ideologically representative (a proposition that has yet to be tested), then they
would exert an aligning influence on the candidates who seek their support. In this case, New York City’s system, unlike most efforts to stimulate contributions, would be valid under the alignment approach.
So too (most likely) would be voucher schemes of the sort proposed
by Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres, 423 Hasen, 424 and Lessig. 425 All of
these schemes would grant to each voter a voucher of a set dollar
amount, which the voter then could disburse to candidates as she saw fit.
If almost all voters took advantage of their vouchers, then the donor
population would closely resemble the general population, and the
vouchers would create powerful aligning incentives for candidates. 426
Even if voucher use was more uneven, it is doubtful that the donor popu418

Compare Wilcox et al., supra note 268, at 66–67 (analyzing presidential donors), and
IPDI Study, supra note 269, at 12 (also analyzing presidential donors), with Francia et al.,
supra note 5, at 27–28 (analyzing congressional donors).
419
See Malbin et al., supra note 344, at 14 (including data for five of these states: Arkansas, Minnesota, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Oregon (of which Arkansas is median)). As noted earlier, Minnesota’s rebate program seems unusually effective at promoting small donor participation. See supra note 350.
420
See Malbin et al., supra note 419, at 14 (showing that Maryland is median such state).
421
See id.
422
See Genn et al., supra note 343, at 14.
423
See Bruce Ackerman & Ian Ayres, Voting with Dollars: A New Paradigm for Campaign Finance 186–222 (2002).
424
See Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy? An Egalitarian/Public
Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1996).
425
See Lessig, supra note 171, at 66.
426
For the reasons discussed earlier, even perfect participation in the voucher system
would not guarantee alignment. See supra Part II (explaining why alignment is distinct from
equality of voter influence).
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lation would be more unrepresentative than it is today, meaning that the
vouchers still would be aligning relative to the status quo.
Finally, though they have not yet been studied by scholars, the existing block grants to the parties seem too small to have much of an effect
on alignment. These grants often are used to cover some of the costs of
state party conventions. 427 They rarely are redistributed to the parties’
actual candidates in substantial sums. 428 However, Lowenstein’s proposal that much larger amounts of public money be provided to the parties, which then could channel the funds to the candidates of their
choice, 429 likely would pass muster under the alignment approach. Since
the parties’ first priority is winning elections, and since moderate candidates are more likely to prevail than extreme ones, the parties probably
would allocate most of their resources to relatively centrist contestants.
This is how the parties deploy their funds today, 430 and there is no obvious reason why their tactics would change if their coffers swelled with
public money.
CONCLUSION
Campaign finance law is in crisis. In a series of unfortunate decisions,
the Supreme Court has rejected state interests such as anti-distortion and
equality, while narrowing the anti-corruption interest to its quid pro quo
core. This core cannot sustain the bulk of campaign finance regulation.
As a result, expenditure limits, aggregate contribution limits, and certain
public financing programs all have been struck down by the Court. If
any meaningful rules are to survive, a new interest capable of justifying
them must be found.
Alignment is just such an interest. The congruence of voters’ preferences with key governmental outputs is a compelling objective because
it accords with core democratic values. Indeed, the Court has said as
427

See Levin, supra note 409, at 27; Public Financing Overview, supra note 404.
See Levin, supra note 409, at 27.
429
See Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil Is
Deeply Rooted, 18 Hofstra L. Rev. 301, 351–52 (1989) (recommending that national parties
be provided with enough funds to support fifty strong challengers nationwide); cf. Peter J.
Wallison & Joel M. Gora, Better Parties, Better Government: A Realistic Program for Campaign Finance Reform 88, 92–111 (2009) (also arguing for larger role for parties in funding
of campaigns). In foreign democracies, it is common for parties to receive large sums of
public funding. See Stephen Ansolabehere, Arizona Free Enterprise v. Bennett and the Problem of Campaign Finance, 2011 Sup. Ct. Rev. 39, 46.
430
See supra notes 306–08, 329–32 and accompanying text.
428
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much on several occasions. Alignment also is a goal that neither is forbidden by general First Amendment principles nor is duplicative of the
interests the Court already has rebuffed. And if it were to be recognized
by the Court, it would result in much (though not all) campaign finance
regulation being upheld. Specifically, policies that curb the influence of
polarized individual funders would be valid. But measures that burden
ideologically moderate funders, such as parties and PACs, could not be
sustained on this basis.
What are the odds that the current Court would adopt the alignment
approach? They are extremely low. The Court’s hostility to campaign
finance regulation is driven above all by its libertarian theory of the First
Amendment, not by its inability to identify suitable interests. But it still
is worthwhile to make the case for alignment. For one thing, the Court
may realize that some regulation serves an end whose significance it has
acknowledged in cases such as McCutcheon. For another, a future Court
may not be as uninterested in new rationales for reform as this one. The
alignment approach offers a receptive majority a roadmap for upholding
policies without reversing the Court’s existing precedents. Finally,
alignment deserves recognition because it is a concept that undeniably is
intertwined with money in politics. In campaign finance law, as in all
law, it is important to be clear about the values that are threatened by unregulated activity and furthered by regulation. And of these values, few
are as vital as alignment.

